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The Newest Member of the Nuclear Club:
Pakistan's Drive for a Nuclear Weapons
Capability and United States Nuclear
Nonproliferation Policy
By STEPHEN H. CASSIDY*
Member of the Class of 1989
I. INTRODUCTION
World public opinion and United States governmental policy con-
sider nuclear proliferation, the spread of the capability to test and pro-
duce nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS),I a grave
threat to global peace and stability.2 The acquisition of atomic bombs by
any nation has enormous implications. The development of imbalances in
military power and the creation of nuclear arms races are primary con-
cerns. Other dangers include greater opportunities for terrorist attacks
and accidental detonation, the rapid escalation of conventional armed
conflict into nuclear confrontations, and the possibility that unstable and
provocative national leaders would actually seek to use nuclear
weapons.3
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dr. Charles K. Ebinger, Mr.
Leonard S. Spector, and Dr. Randy Rydell for their contributions to this Note.
1. The term nuclear proliferation has two definitions. Originally, nuclear proliferation
referred solely to the actual testing and production of nuclear weapons by nations. Today, the
term is more broadly defined. As used in this note, it is the spread among nations of the
capability to test and produce nuclear weapons. See Donnelly, Changing Pressures on the Non-
Proliferation Regime, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 1983, at 69, 74 (1983).
2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, § 2, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1982) ("The Congress
finds and declares that the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or of the direct capability
to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices poses a grave threat to the security interests
of the United States and to continued international progress toward world peace and develop-
ment."). While this finding states the consensus view, a revisionist school on the dangers of
proliferation does exist. See eg., Bueno & Riker, An Assessment of the Merits of Selective
Nuclear Proliferation, 26 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 283 (1982); Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: More May Be Better, 171 ADELPHI PAPERS 1 (1981). Moreover, there are ever
present voices proclaiming proliferation's inevitability. See Weltman, Managing Nuclear Mul-
tipolarity, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1981/82, at 182.
3. See, ag., L. DUNN, CONTROLLING THE BOMB: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE
1980s 176 (1982); Quester, Introduction: In Defense of Some Optimism, in NUCLEAR
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One of the most significant developments in international nuclear
PROLIFERATION: BREAKING THE CHAIN 1, 9-12 (G. Quester ed. 1981); Shultz, Preventing the
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 17, 18. For a classic essay
on the enormity of the destructive power of atomic bombs and the challenges of the nuclear
age, see Andrews, Commandments in the Atomic Age, in PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 130
(C. Mitcham & R. Mackey eds. 1983). The rate of proliferation is also a concern because the
faster the rate, the lesser the chance of managing the destabilizing effects of proliferation, U.S.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982) [hereinafter U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy] (statement of Jo-
seph S. Nye, Professor of Government, Harvard University).
In the specific context of the Third World, the risks of nuclear proliferation are magnified.
Commentators often cite the current balance of terror between the United States and the So-
viet Union as evidence for the proposition that further proliferation will lead to regional bal-
ances of power around the globe. Such analysis fails to appreciate two critical factors in the
United States-Soviet relationship that are not present in the Third World.
First, the political stability of governments of developing nations remains substantially
lower than in the cases of the Soviet Union and the United States. Since the end of World War
II, millions of people have died in the Third World in the course of revolutions, coups, assassi-
nations, civil wars, national wars, genocide and ethnic strife. HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY
GROUP, LIVING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 216-17 (1983). See L. DUNN, supra, at 69-71.
In India, more than 1,800 people were killed and 5,000 wounded in political and sectarian
violence during 1987. India Rocked by Rebellions, Daily Advertiser (Lafayette, La.), Jan. 5,
1988, at 17, col. 1. The same year, more than 200 people were killed by bombings in Pakistan,
Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 3. In one three day period, over 200 people were killed In
random attacks by a band of armed men throughout two of Pakistan's provinces. Fineman,
Horror Grips Pakistan - Massacre Toll Reaches 210, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 4, 1988, at
A15, col. 1. See generally Spaeth, Pakistan's Teeming Commercial Capital Is Beset by Vio-
lence, Inadequate Services, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 8, col. 4.
The heads of state of both nations have died while in office during the 1980s. On October
31, 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India was assassinated by two of her bodyguards,
who were of followers of the Sikh religion. O'Brien, Holy War Against India, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Aug. 1988, at 54, 58. On August 17, 1988, President Mohammmad Zia ul-Haq of
Pakistan was killed when the Pakistani Air Force plane he was flying in exploded in mid-air.
Sciolino, Zia of Pakistan Killed as Blast Downs Plane; U.S. Envoy, 28 Others Die, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 3. Whether the crash was the result of an aircraft malfunction or an
act of sabotage was not conclusively established by the American and Pakistani investigators.
See, e-g., McGee, Expert Backs Pakistan on Crash Cause, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1988, at A25,
col. 4; Sciolino, Report on Zia Crash: Pakistan and U.S. View Issue With Different Prisms,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1988, at A6, col. 1; Trainor, Malfunction Seen as Cause of Zia Crash,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at A3, col. 4.
The second major reason the dangers of nuclear proliferation are magnified in the Third
World is that the mere possession of nuclear weapons does not lead to deterrence; only those
weapons systems which can survive a nuclear attack and return a devastating blow contribute
to stability. For any nation that has developed nuclear weapons the transition from simple
possession to assured second-strike capability would be precarious and could encourage a pre-
emptive strike by a hostile neighboring state. HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra, at
217-18. See L. DUNN, supra, at 73. Given a 1980 Iranian attack on Iraq's Osirak research
reactor and its latter destruction by Israeli warplanes on June 7, 1981, such pre-emptive strikes
can no longer be considered hypothetical possibilities. See L. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFER-
ATION TODAY 174, 178 (1984). Reports surfaced in the summer of 1984 that India was con-
sidering an attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Cronin, India and Pakistan, in LIMITING
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 59, 78 (J. Synder & S. Wells, Jr. eds. 1985). On December 17,
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politics is Pakistan reaching the threshold of possessing nuclear weapons.
After its military defeat at the hands of India in 1971, Pakistan actively
sought a nuclear weapons capability.4 By 1987, according to informed
commentators, Pakistan possessed all of the key components and the
technical ability needed to construct nuclear weapons.5
An immediate and principal danger to international security from
Pakistan's nuclear activities is that India might respond to this activity
by integrating nuclear weapons into its armed forces, thereby igniting a
nuclear arms race in South Asia.6 Never before has there been a situa-
1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India and President Zia of Pakistan pledged not to
attack the nuclear facilities of either nation. Weisman, Ghandhi-Zia Talks Said to Bear Fruit,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1985, at A3, col. 1. Yet the verbal agreement was not incorporated into
a peace treaty because of the "intense mutual suspicions" between the two nations. Rao, India.
Pakistan Racing to be Last, BULL AToM. SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1987, at 32, 33. See Ali, The
Obstacles Remain, FAR E. ECoN. REv., Mar. 12, 1987, at 35, 36. However, in December
1988, both nations signed a treaty not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Ali, A Hint of
Hope, FAR E. EcoN. l~v., Jan. 12, 1989, at 10, 10.
4. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
5. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and US National Security: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1987) [hereinafter Nuclear Non-
Proliferation] (testimony of Leonard S. Spector, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace). See eg., Crawford, Pakistan Thought to Possess Atomic Bomb, 235 Scl.
1131, 1131 (1987); Hevesi, Mohammad Zia ul-Haq: Unbending Commander for Era of Atom
and Islam, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1988, at A7, col. 1; Ottaway, Pakistani A-Bomb Seen Likely,
Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1987, at Al, col. 13.
6. Millholin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L 593, 593 (1987). See. eg.,
Elkin & Ritezel, The Indo-Pakistani Military Balance, 26 AsIAN SURv. 518, 537 (1986); Mur-
phy, Pakistan and the Nuclear Issue, DEP'T ST. BULL, Oct. 1987, at 53, 53.
The United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China and, most likely, Israel
and South Africa maintain nuclear arsenals. Munro, Knocking at the Nuclear Door, TIME,
Mar. 30, 1987, at 42, 42. India tested a nuclear device on May 18, 1974. Since that date, India
has not conducted any further nuclear explosions. India has the facilities and nuclear material
to produce a significant number of nuclear weapons. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 23, 58-59.
It is disputed whether India has stockpiled nuclear weapons. The United Press Interna-
tional reported in 1988, based on U.S. intelligence sources, that "India has assembled a hand-
ful of highly sophisticated low-yield atomic bombs that can be delivered to targets by combat
aircraft." Sale, 'City buster' Atomic Bombs Reportedly Amassed by India, San Francisco
Chron., Mar. 20, 1988, at A9, col. I. A report prepared earlier in the year for the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace concluded that India had not deployed nuclear weapons
into its armed forces. THE CARNEGIE TASK FORCE ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND SOUTH
AsIAN SECURITY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY 1 (1988) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE]. However, the Task Force ominously found that:
[ilf present trends continue, an open-ended nuclear arms race in South Asia
appears inevitable; arguably it has already begun. Currently it appears that both
nations would be able to manufacture atomic bombs during any crisis lasting more
than several weeks and to deliver such weapons by aircraft. Momentum is building,
moreover, toward further nuclearization. A critical factor is that both nations ap-
pear to be striving to accumulate nuclear weapons material free from non-prolifera-
tion controls. Thus, even if their respective nuclear weapons programs remain
1989]
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tion where two nuclear-armed nations have shared a common and dis-
puted border, a history of prior wars and high tensions, and great
internal instability.'
A nuclear arms race in South Asia could trigger the collapse of the
system of export controls on commercial nuclear technology established
by the nuclear supplier nations. The nuclear facilities that both Pakistan
and India have used to produce nuclear weapons have either been im-
ported, in some cases illegally, or built with foreign designs.8
Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the
United States created a multi-billion dollar aid program for Pakistan.
United States policymakers hoped this economic and military assistance
would, in part, curb Pakistan's desire for a nuclear weapons capability.
Within a few years, it was apparent that Pakistan's nuclear program was
continuing unabated. The United States, however, decided to renew the
aid package in 1987. It was perceived to be in the United States national
interest to provide funds for Pakistan, despite nonproliferation concerns,
in return for Pakistan's support of the Afghan rebels resisting the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.
Today, the nuclear rivalry in South Asia poses one of the greatest
challenges for United States nuclear nonproliferation policy. This Note
examines the United States nuclear nonproliferation policy in regard to
Pakistan, but that is not the author's sole purpose. Foreign policy deci-
sions are not made in a vacuum. To analyze Uniled States policy to-
wards Pakistan it is necessary to have both a conceptual and historical
understanding of the nuclear nonproliferation regime,' including the ef-
undeclared, the number of weapons potentially available to each side will steadily
increase in the months and years ahead. By late 1990, Pakistan could have as many
as 15 Hiroshima-size devices, while India might have produced more than 100.
Id. at 2. See The Subcontinent Goes Critical, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1987, at 36, 36.
7. Nuclear Non-Proliferation, supra note 5, at 8 (testimony of Leonard Spector). India
and Pakistan have fought three wars since independence from Great Britain. Both nations
claim the Kashmir region, of which India holds two-thirds of the total area. Both nations have
also suffered from ethnic tensions and fundamental disputes involving their identity. Despite
summit meetings of each nations' leaders and discussions on normalizing relations, Indo-Paki-
stan relations have been extremely strained throughout the 1980s. See, e.g., Cronin, supra note
3, at 72-77. Border clashes occurred regularly between the two nations from 1983 through
1987. High hand in High Places, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1987, at 39, 39. At the beginning of
1987 there was a "war scare" stemming from each other's military exercises. See Nuclear Non.
Proliferation, supra note 5, at 192 (text of Ambassador Deane Hinton's speech of February 16,
1987).
8. See Millholin, supra note 6, at 593.
9. "A commonly accepted definition of international regimes is a set of implicit or ex-
plicit 'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expecta-
tions converge in a given issue-area.'" Smith, Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime:
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forts of the United States. Once that is provided, a review of Pakistan's
efforts to build a bomb and an analysis of the American response will
follow, including a review of the 1987 battle on Capitol Hill over Presi-
dent Reagan's second foreign assistance package for Pakistan.
This Note argues that any United States attempt to coerce the
Pakistani government not to develop nuclear weapons, by threatening a
termination of United States assistance, will ultimately be counter-
productive and accelerate nuclear proliferation in South Asia. A more
thoughtful and productive policy for the United States would place a
greater emphasis on the tensions between India and Pakistan in its for-
eign policy and encourage a peaceful resolution of the nuclear rivalry
between both nations.
HI. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
National interest dictates a nation's decisions and actions.10 Other
than specialized concerns based on the efficient functioning of interna-
tional relations, it is rare for a broad range of states to formulate and
abide by a shared set of commitments, obligations, rules, and practices.II
Yet motivated by the collective fear of nuclear annihilation, the world
community has established normative regulations and constraints to halt
the spread of nuclear weaponry and also to further the peaceful use of
commercial nuclear power.12
These rules and practices are embodied in the Partial Test Ban
Treaty,13 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," its regional facsimile the
Treaty of Tlatelolco,15 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review confer-
Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory, 41 INT'L ORo. 253, 253 (1987)
(quoting Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequencer" Regimes as Intervening Vari-
ables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (S. Krasner ed. 1983)).
10. H. MORGENTHAU, POLITIcs AMONG NATIONs 4-8 (5th ed. rev. 1978).
11. See id at 280-81. "International law owes its existence and operation to two factors,
both decentralized in character: identical or complementary interests of individual states and
the distribution of power among them. Where there is neither community of interest nor
balance of power, there is no international law." Id. at 282.
12. Smith, supra note 9, at 257.
13. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, adopted Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (known as
the Partial Test Ban Treaty).
14. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty].
15. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature
1989]
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ences held every five years,16 the final reports of the International Fuel
Cycle Evaluation,17 the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency,18 the Nuclear Supplier Group's guidelines and bilateral agree-
ments,19 legislation by national governments, 20 and a general worldwide
concern against additional nations testing nuclear weapons. 21 Together,
they form the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.22
The nuclear nonproliferation regime can be conceived of as operat-
ing on two levels. The first is the political level and the second is the
technical and institutional level.23 As we will see in the discussion of the
history of the regime, national nuclear strategies have at varying times
emphasized one level over the other. It is important first to examine
how, and with what degree of success, individual nations effectuate their
national strategies within the regime. Some of the key issues that must
be addressed in formulating national nonproliferation policy are the con-
cepts of sovereignty and leverage, technological capability, and certain
caveats for state action.
Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (known as the Treaty of
Tlatelolco).
16. For a summary of the Third NPT Review Conference held in the summer of 1985 and
attended by 86 of the Treaty's then 130 parties, see Power, The Mixed State of Non-prol /era.
tion: the NPT Review Conference and Beyond, 62 INT'L AFr. 477 (1986).
17. See infra notes 98, 100, 113-15 and accompanying text.
18. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, amended Oct. 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135,
T.I.A.S. No. 5284, 471 U.N.T.S. 334.
19. See Donnelly, supra note 1, at 70-71; infra note 75 and accompanying text.
20. For example, see Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat.
120 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 and 42 U.S.C.).
21. See L. DUNN, supra note 3, at 17; NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NU-
CLEAR POWER IssuES AND CHOICES 288 (S. Keeny chrm. 1977).
22. See Nye, Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION:
BREAKING THE CHAIN, supra note 3, at 15, 16.
The regime can claim partial credit for the fact that no nation since China in 1964 has
produced and exploded a nuclear device for the avowed purpose of establishing a nuclear
weapons force. See HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 215-216, (The In-
dian nuclear explosion in 1974 was described as "a peaceful nuclear explosion intended to
study the cratering and cracking effects on rocks." L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 34 (footnote
omitted)).
Over time, though, the nature of nuclear proliferation has changed. In the late 1960s, a
second wave of proliferation commenced. No longer did nations overtly test and develop nu-
clear weapons. Nations such as Israel and South Africa have found their national interests
better served by covertly stockpiling nuclear bombs. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 5. See
Donnelly, supra note 1, at 70-74.
23. W. WALKER & M. LONNROTH, NUCLEAR POWER STRUGGLES 18 (1983).
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A. Sovereignty And International Regulation24
The nation-state is the basic political unit and highest law-giving
authority in the world political system, except for a unanimous vote of
the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.25 After
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil
embargo of 1973-74 and the dramatic rise in oil prices, many states, in-
cluding Pakistan, saw the construction of nuclear reactors for the genera-
tion of electricity as the only alternative to dependency on imported oil.26
To receive commercial nuclear power technology and materials, the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all NNWS to forswear the
manufacture of nuclear weapons and to accept International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.2 7 IAEA safeguards consist of regular
inspection and the auditing of nuclear materials passing through nuclear
facilities.2" The line between necessary restrictions and undue infringe-
ment of national autonomy is not always clear. This partially explains
why the NPT has not been accepted by all nations.29
B. Leverage and Technological Capability
The ability of the United States to influence another nation's nuclear
24. Sovereignty refers to the existence of a central nation-state exercising lawmaking and
law-enforcing authority within its territory. 11 MORGENTHAu, supra note 10, at 315.
25. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41,42, 51; H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 10 at 316-17; .
SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 1294, 1304 (3d ed. 1988). It is important to note that the United Nation's
recent successes in regional conflicts "owe much to an unprecedented new spate of diplomacy
among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council." Serrill, Peace on the
March, TIME, Sept. 26, 1988, at 34, 35.
26. Ebinger, International Politics of Nuclear Energy, 57 WASH. PAPERS 7, 49 (1978).
(Only the Arab states within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries participated
in the 1973-74 oil embargo). See Stobaugh, World Energy to the Year 2000, in GLOBAL INSE-
cunrr 29, 29 (1982) ("Observers predicted that the very large increases in oil prices in 1973-
74 would speed the development of nuclear power, indeed, Western leaders made nuclear
power the cornerstone of their national energy plans.").
27. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, supra note 14, arts. II-III.
28. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
29. Se eg., W. WALKER & M. .6NNROTH, supra note 23, at 10; Nye, NPT" The Logic of
Inequality, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1985, at 123, 126 ("Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pak-
istan, and South Africa... have rejected the NPT. They consider it unacceptably discrimina-
tory and hypocritical for the superpowers to maintain weapons denied to other states.");
Quester, Preventing Proliferation. The Impact on International Politics, in NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION: BREAKING THE CHAIN, supra note 3, at 213, 214-15. The above quotation is
not entirely correct in regard to Pakistan. Pakistan is not philosophically opposed to the NPT;
rather, it refuses to sign as long as India maintains a nuclear option. A STAFF REPORT TO THE
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., NUCLEAR PROLIFEA-
TION IN SOUTH ASIA: CONTAINING THE THREAT 7 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter STAFF
REPORT].
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policy-the concept of leverage-depends upon a group of factors in-
cluding the following: level of technological capability, scientific infra-
structure, governmental stability, perceived security needs, economic
well-being, and political relationships.3"
Leverage can be a double-edged sword. No nation desires to be ex-
cessively dependent on another nation and the exercise of such domina-
tion can spur indigenous programs and self-reliance.31 For example,
United States technological dominance in the 1960s allowed it to monop-
olize the European and Japanese commercial nuclear energy markets. It
was only a matter of time before the Europeans and Japanese developed
their own technologies after the United States frequently exploited its
position of dominance.
32
In the Third World, United States opposition can delay, but not
indefinitely prevent, a nation that has a moderately developed scientific
infrastructure and is politically committed from developing a nuclear
weapons capability.33 Where a nation has a limited scientific base, as in
30. See, eg., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND
SAFEGUARDS SUMMARY 10-12 (Mar. 1982). It is estimated that 30 to 40 nations will have the
capability to construct a nuclear weapon by the year 2000. HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY
GROUP, supra note 3, at 221-22. But only a handful of these nations will choose to construct
nuclear weapons. The primary motivations to attain a weapons capability are security and, to
a lesser extent, prestige. Goheen, Problems ofProliferation: U.S. Policy and the Third World,
35 WORLD POL. 194, 206-07 (1983). Most nations with the capability have no intention to
build nuclear weapons. Their security needs are either satisfied by an alliance with a nuclear
weapons state or their own conventional forces, and the status incentive is not present,
HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 221. See, e.g., L. DUNN, supra note 3, at
11-14; NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 287.
31. Smith & Rathjens, Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 59 FOREIGN AFF.
875, 892 (1981). In addition, policymakers would be well advised to appreciate that highly
confrontational demands breed opposition and are ultimately unsuccessful. History is filled
with such examples. The XYZ Affair of 1797-98 between France and United States should
have been on the minds of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Chrintopher and Vice President
Walter Mondale during their visit to Brazil in early 1977. The United States negotiating
team's "arrogant behavior" only exacerbated tensions over the German-Brazilian fuel cycle
technologies transfer. Ebinger, supra note 26, at 65.
32. See Ebinger, supra note 26, at 38-39; Nye, supra note 22, at 20. The preeminent posi-
tion of the United States has deteriorated to the point that Japan is now becoming the world's
center for commercial nuclear reactor technology. Walker & L6nnroth, Proliferation and Nu-
clear Trade:- A Look Ahead, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1984, at 29, 31.
33. See HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 220 ("Eventually, govern-
ments with a reasonable technical infrastructure that are strongly committed to get hold of
weapons-grade uranium or plutonium will probably be able to do so, though the process may
take considerably longer than they initially expect.").
Scientists in most nations today can design a nuclear device. However, nations with a
strong desire to construct nuclear weapons face the great technological problem of gaining
possession of sufficient nuclear explosive material. Either uranium-235 or plutonium-239 can
be used for the core of a nuclear device. Neither of these materials is found in nature. They
[Vol. 12
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the case of Libya, cutting off technology can be effective.3 In some situ-
ations, however, it may result in the loss of influence and temporarily
strengthen local "pro-bomb" advocates.
35
As nuclear capabilities spread and American influence on interna-
tional energy and security policies diminishes,3 the political dimension
of nuclear proliferation assumes a pivotal role.37 Technical approaches
such as export embargoes, and institutional solutions-principally IAEA
safeguards-are fundamental components of the nonproliferation regime.
Alone, however, these measures can not halt proliferation since the deci-
sion to manufacture a nuclear weapon is essentially a political one.38
can only be produced through two different methods: uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing. Id. at 219-20; L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 426-27.
Before enrichment, natural uranium contains 0.7 percent uranium-235. Weapons grade
uranium must usually be "enriched" to over ninety percent uranium-235 at an uranium en-
richment facility. Given the great complexity of the process and the enormous expense of
these facilities, experts considered uranium enrichment as a less likely path to proliferation
than obtaining plutonium-239. Nevertheless, Argentina, South Africa, and Pakistan have con-
structed uranium enrichment plants. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 427.
A nation must have a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium. While the reactor is operat-
ing, the uranium is bombarded by neutrons which transform some of the uranium fuel into
plutonium-239. The "spent" fuel is then chemically treated at a reprocessing plant to separate
the plutonium from the residual uranium and other radioactive byproducts. Id. at 429. See
HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 220.
34. Goheen, supra note 30, at 210. See L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 161-62 ("Libya has
made little progress towards developing a nuclear capability, however, largely because of its
technological skills are limited and many nations are reluctant to provide it with nuclear
aid."). In 1984, the Reagan Administration convinced the Belgian government to cancel an
agreement for nuclear cooperation with Libya worth over one billion dollars. Nuclear Con-
tract Lost, AFR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 44, 44.
35. After analyzing the Pakistani-United States relationship, one commentator concluded
that "the case of Pakistan chiefly seems to show... that pressures, controls, and denials are
unable to stop a country that has both the scientific skills and the political determination to
acquire nuclear weapons - unless, perhaps, such a country feels a heavy security dependence
on the United States." Goheen, supra note 30, at 203-04.
36. See Nacht, The Future Unlike the Past: Nuclear Proliferation and American Security
Policy, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: BREAKING THE CHAIN, supra note 3, at 193, 209.
37. See Shultz, supra note 3, at 18 ("America no longer dominates the nuclear field
scientifically or commercially - as it once did. As mastery of the technology has spread, it has
been harder to persuade others simply to follow our lead, let alone dictate their actions and
choices. Now more than ever, a successful nonproliferation effort requires cooperative under-
takings involving both suppliers and users of nuclear technology, taking into account their
energy needs, commercial interests, and concerns about their sovereignty."). See. ,g., OFFCE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 30, at 10; NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY
GROUP, supra note 21, at 286-91.
38. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 30, at 10; Bolet, Ebinger, Pilat
& Pendey, Atoms for Peace After Thirty Years, VI SIGNIFICANT ISSUES SERIES 31-32 (1984)
(remarks of Lawrence Scheinman of Cornell University); Gummett, From NPT to INFCF
Developments in Thinking About Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 57 INT'L AFF. 549, 562-63 (1981).
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
C. Caveats to State Action
It is important to emphasize that specific constraints on any nation's
nonproliferation policy exist. First, general approaches must be adapted
to individual nations. It is unrealistic and potentially counterproductive,
to apply a blanket nonproliferation policy uniformly to all nations. All
nations have unique histories, security interests, nuclear motivations, ca-
pabilities, and political situations.39 For example, the construction of a
reprocessing plant in Japan would not evidence a covert program to ob-
tain nuclear explosive-or fissile-material, whereas with Pakistan it
would.
The second constraint on nonproliferation policy is that prolifera-
tion consists of many steps. Joseph Nye, the architect of President
Carter's policy, speaks of proliferation as being a "staircase" with each
step requiring a specific response.4° The purchase of commercial nuclear
power plants might be the first step. Or a nation might construct facili-
ties for the production of fissile material followed by the testing of an
atomic bomb. Eventually, the nation may decide to continue testing nu-
clear weapons and deploy a nuclear weapons force.41
The third caveat to nonproliferation policy concerns the unpredict-
ability of even the near future. President Kennedy envisioned the possi-
bility that there would be fifteen to twenty-five nuclear weapons states by
the 1970s.42 Chance is certainly one of the elements that contributed to
the slow rate of proliferation and the nonuse of nuclear weapons after
1945. 41 The Iraqi use of chemical weapons in its war against Iran illus-
trates how decades of restraint and international convention can evapo-
rate overnight." High interest rates, world recession, low electricity
demand, falling oil prices, and skyrocketing construction costs all left the
most respected predictions in the 1970s of the nuclear industry's growth
worthless by the mid-1980s.
45
The last caveat is that nonproliferation policy competes with other
foreign policy objectives. In the mid-1970s, several circumstances com-
39. See, e.g., Gummett, supra note 38, at 565-67; Schlesinger, Forward, in LIMITING Nu-
CLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 3, at ix, x-xi; Smith & Rathjens, supra note 31, at 892.
40. Nye, supra note 22, at 33.
41. See L. DUNN, supra note 3, at 139; HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note
3, at 224-25.
42. See HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 215.
43. See L. DUNN, supra note 3, at 23.
44. See L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 184.
45. See Stobaugh, supra note 26, at 47-50. In the United States, there has not been a new
order for a nuclear power plant that was not later canceled since 1974. Davidson, Nuclear
power: Worst May be Yet to Come, San Francisco Exam., Nov. 29, 1987, at A16, col. 1.
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bined to make nonproliferation one of the highest United States foreign
policy priorities. India's successful nuclear test in 1974 shattered the
United States government's laissez-faire nuclear export policy. The
1973-74 oil embargo contributed to widespread expectations of an ex-
panded role for the peaceful use of nuclear power. Supplier nations
signed contracts with developing countries for facilities that could have
provided those countries with fissile material. 6
By the end of the decade, a worsening adversarial relationship with
the Soviet Union, highlighted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979, led to a shift in United States foreign policy priorities. Previous
Carter Administration goals of conventional arms restraint, discourage-
ment of security commitments in the Third World, and ostracism of na-
tions engaged in nuclear weapons proliferation gave way to a
reaffirmation of the United States defense treaty with Pakistan by Presi-
dent Carter and an offer of 400 million dollars in economic and military
aid.47
III. HISTORY OF THE REGIME AND
UNITED STATES POLICY
A. 1945 to 1973
After the Baruch Plan failed, the history of the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime from 1945 to 1973 occurred in two stages; first,
the creation of a United States monopoly and embargo of nuclear tech-
nology; and second, the promotion of nuclear power coupled with
safeguards.
1. The Baruch Plan
On June 14, 1946, United States Ambassador Bernard Baruch of-
fered before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to surren-
der United States nuclear technology to an International Atomic
46. See ag., L. DUNN, supra note 3, at 32-33; Bolet, Ebinger, Pilat & Pendley, supra note
38, at 10-11; Nye, supra note 22, at 18-19.
47. See, eg., L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 85; Lellouche, Breaking the Rules Without
Quite Stopping the Bomb: European Views, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: BREAKING THE
CHAIN, supra note 3, at 39, 39; Smith & Rathjens, supra note 31, at 884; Van Hollen,
MrGandhi the General, and the Bomb, WASH. Q., Spring 1981, at 157, 160.
In his State of the Union message to Congress, President Carter stated that "[tihe
changed security situation in South Asia arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan calls"
for renewed aid to Pakistan, "[blut this in no way diminishes our commitment to work to
prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, in Pakistan or elsewhere." Annual Message to the
Congress, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DoC. 114, 172 (Jan. 21, 1980).
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Development Aiithority which would manage, control and inspect all
atomic activities from the mining of uranium to the operation of atomic
reactors and the conduct of atomic research and development.48 The So-
viet Union rejected the plan and the United States responded by sealing
off access to its atomic research, technology and materials to the rest of
the world.49 Congress codified this wall of secrecy in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946.50 The policy of secrecy and denial did not work; the Soviet
Union detonated an atom bomb in 1949 and Great Britain followed in
1953.51
2. "Atoms For Peace"
In an address to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, President
Eisenhower ushered in a new era in nuclear politics by unveiling the "At-
oms for Peace" program. 52  "Atoms for Peace" reversed the United
States policy of denial and established the direction of American nuclear
exports for the next twenty years. President Eisenhower specifically
called for the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) operated under the aegis of the U.N. The IAEA would promote
the peaceful use of atomic power, with a special mission "to provide
abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world."5"
"Atoms-for-Peace" was a genuine effort by President Eisenhower to
counter the threat of nuclear war.54 Simultaneously, it served United
States economic and political interests by positioning the United States to
48. See United States Atomic Energy Proposals (presented to the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission by Bernard Baruch, June 14, 1946), reprinted in CONG. RES. SERVIcn,
96TH CONG., 2D SFss., NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FAcTBOOK 13, 13-14 (Joint Comm. Print
1980) [hereinafter FAcTBOOK].
49. Lellouche, supra note 47, at 40. The proposal failed because the Soviet Union insisted
that the United.States first destroy its nuclear weapons before the Authority was established
and the United States refused. See M. MANDELBAUM, THE NUCLEAR QUESTION 25-26
(1979); W. WALKER & M. L6NNROTH, supra note 23, at 6.
50. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755 (amended 1954). The main provisions of the
Act stipulated that:
the government obtained title to all nuclear facilities in which fissionable nuclear
materials could be manufactured and became the sole proprietor of all fissionable
materials. The act classified as secret all information regarding the utilization of
fissionable materials for the generation of commercial nuclear power and prohibited
all U.S. nationals, including the scientific community, from sharing with other na-
tions any technical data concerning the use of atomic power for industrial purposes,
Ebinger, supra note 26, at 10.
51. See W. WALKER & M. LONNROTH, supra note 23, at 6-7.
52. Address by President Eisenhower Before the United Nations General Assembly (Dec.
8, 1953), reprinted in FACTBOOK, supra note 48, at 24, 24.
53. Id. at 29.
54. Bolet, Ebinger, Pilat & Pendley, supra note 38, at 5.
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dominate the global development of commercial nuclear power.55 As
codified by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the program assisted foreign
nations in the peaceful use of nuclear power as long as they accepted
safeguards and agreed not to divert the research and nuclear materials
for military purposes. 6 The potential contradictions between the pro-
motion of nuclear energy and proliferation were not realized until much
later.5 7
The IAEA was established in 1957 with the twin aims of promoting
the peaceful and safe development of atomic energy and ensuring that the
assistance provided by the Agency was not used for any covert activity.58
Until the mid-1960s, its role in the regime was minor.5 9 Soviet accept-
ance of international safeguards and a rethinking about the dangers of
proliferation transformed the Agency and led to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty.'
3. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of
the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It divides the world into two groups
of nations: those nations that had tested a nuclear weapon before 1967,
nuclear weapons states (NWS), and those nations which had not, non-
nuclear weapons states (NNWS).61
55. Ebinger, supra note 26, at 13.
56. See Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1955) (amended 1978); W. WALKER & M.
LbNNROTH, supra note 23, at 10.
Research reactors were supplied to many nations and the United States signed bilateral
agreements of nuclear cooperation with over forty nations between 1955 and 1958. W.
WALKER & M. LONNROTH, supra note 23, at 10-11. Pakistan never signed a bilateral agree-
ment with the United States although it did receive through the IAEA a United States manu-
factured research reactor. In addition, 20 Pakistani scientists were trained in the United
States. Bolet, Ebinger, Pilat & Pendley, supra note 38, at 23.
57. See Nye, supra note 22, at 17.
58. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 18, art. II.
59. The Agency initially concentrated on health and safety concerns associated with nu-
clear energy and provided technical and research assistance. Large scale nuclear power pro-
duction was still on the drawing boards and it took time to implement safeguards. See W.
WALKER & M. L6NNROTH, supra note 23, at 14-15; Ebinger, supra note 26, at 13. Today,
IAEA safeguards comprise a system of on-site inspections, physical inventories and audits. L.
SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 434. See W. WALKER & M. L&NNROTH, supra note 23, at 10. The
IAEA has over 110 member states and conducted nearly 2,000 inspections at over 500 facilities
in 1985. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation, supra note 5, at 215-217 (statement of Hans Blix,
IAEA Director General to the United Nations).
60. See W. WALKER & M. LONNROTH, supra note 23, at 15-16, 120-22.
61. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 437. The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain,
France, and China had exploded a nuclear weapon prior to 1967. Id. France and China have
never signed the NPT, though France pledged to behave as if it were a party. China in 1983
announced that it would require IAEA safeguards on all its future nuclear exports. Id. at 439.
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Article I requires that all NWS agree not to transfer or assist any
NNWS in acquiring a nuclear weapon.62 NNWS in Article II undertake
not to receive or manufacture a nuclear weapon and in Article III agree
to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, known as
"full scope" safeguards.63 Article IV states that all parties to the treaty
shall have the right to the fullest possible exchange of nuclear technol-
ogy."4 NNWS are promised access to the potential benefits of any peace-
ful applications of nuclear explosions in Article V.65 Under Article VI
each party to the treaty pledges to pursue negotiations in good faith to
end the nuclear arms race.66
The survival of the NPT has always been in question because of four
serious weaknesses. The first weakness concerns the nature of the execu-
tive agent of the treaty, the IAEA. IAEA "full scope" safeguards stipu-
lated in Article III are designed to provide a "timely detection" if a
diversion of nuclear material has occurred. The system is similar to a
burglar alarm. As such, the safeguards act as a deterrent to any diver-
sion, but they do not prevent a clandestine nuclear program.67
Although 139 nations have ratified the NPT, EL second weakness of
the treaty is that nations posing the greatest proliferation risks are non-
signators: India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Israel.
Other potential proliferators, Iraq and Libya, could withdraw from the
treaty in three months. 68  Third, the NPT accepts a static, two-tiered
structure of the world. While this inequality is acceptable to almost all
nations, NPT rejectionist states refuse to forsake the prerogative to man-
ufacture nuclear weapons when the five recognized NWS expand their
62. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, supra note 14, art. I.
63. Id. arts. II-III. In addition, exporters of nuclear technology and material usually in-
sist that their items be placed under IAEA safeguards even if the recipient nation is not a party
to the NPT. The result is that 96 nations have agreed to safeguards which cover over 95% of
the nuclear facilities outside the five NWS. Miller, Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
TECH. REV., Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 68, 70.
64. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, supra note 14, art. IV.
65. Id. art. V.
66. rd. art. VI.
67. HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 230-31; Ebinger, supra note 26,
at 13-14. "[T]he IAEA is not an international police agency with broad authority to search for
missing materials and prevent, rather then just detect, diversion, In a world of sovereign
states, it would be unrealistic to expect any international organization to be granted such pow-
ers." Miller, supra note 63, at 72. Fourteen facilities are known to be operating in five nations
that are not parties to the NPT: Argentina, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa. Id. at
70.
68. See L. DUNN, supra note 3, at 144-46; L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 8; Ebinger, supra
note 26, at 44.
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weapons forces in violation of the spirit of Article VI.69 Last, conflicts
have arisen between NNWS pledges not to develop nuclear weapons and
the agreement by NWS to provide commercial nuclear power technology
to NNWS.7°
B. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
Oil Embargo Through Ford Administration
The events of 1973-75 shook the international nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime. Western nations reacted to the OAPEC oil embargo of
1973-74 by drafting plans that called for huge expansions in nuclear
.power production. In May 1974, India exploded a nuclear device. In
1975, France and West Germany signed a series of bilateral contracts
with Third World nations for the construction of nuclear power plants.
France and West Germany "sweetened" their deals by also agreeing to
sell plutonium reprocessing and nuclear enrichment plants, so-called
"sensitive technologies" because of their production of fissile material.
Brazil was to receive enrichment and reprocessing technologies and facil-
ities from West Germany. South Korea and Pakistan were to buy
reprocessing facilities from France.71
Proponents presented reasonable arguments for these sales. The
United States reliability as a supplier of enriched uranium was seen by
foreign nations as quite low.72 Plutonium reprocessing would help man-
age nuclear waste, improve the efficient use of scarce uranium in existing
reactors, and pave the way to a new generation of breeder reactors using
plutonium as their fuel.7' Critics maintained that the facilities had no
economic justification and would provide these nations with fissile
material.74
President Ford responded to these events by calling a Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group to convene in London. Consisting of Western and Soviet
69. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
70. Bolet, Ebinger, Pilat & Pendley, supra note 38, at 29-30. For example, Libya has
certainly had its Article IV rights violated, justified by evidence of a desire to possess nuclear
weapons, a breach of Article II. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 26, 46 and accompanying text. South Korea, after the United States
threatened to terminate its security guarantees, decided to forego plutonium reprocessing. See
HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 223. Despite United States pressure,
West Germany and Brazil refused to cancel their agreement. L. DUNN, supra note 3, at 33.
72. See Ebinger, supra note 26, at 40-41, 55. No doubt reinforcing this view, the United
States closed its order books for future sales of enriched uranium in 1974 because of fear of
excessive demand. See Nye, supra note 22, at 20.
73. See NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 319-21; Lellouche,
supra note 47, at 52-53.
74. See NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 294-97.
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Bloc nations, including non-NPT party France, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group agreed not to export any nuclear materials or equipment without
IAEA safeguards and to exercise restraint in future sales of enrichment
and reprocessing facilities.75
Alarmed at the events of 1973-75 and at the apparent acquiescence
of the Ford Administration to the French-Pakistani deal, Congress inter-
vened with passage of the Symington Amendment.76 The Symington
Amendment added section 669 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It
mandated a cutoff of United States military and economic assistance to
any nation that exported or imported nuclear reprocessing or enrichment
facilities, unless that nation accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards.77
One year later, the Glenn Amendment revised the Symington
Amendment. The Glenn Amendment created section 670 in the Act to
separate the provisions relating to enrichment from the language on
reprocessing and to include new language on the detonation of nuclear
weapons. 78 The Glenn-Symington Amendments, in turn, were amended
by the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981
to add Congressional vetoes by concurrent resolution and to provide a
separate and strengthened subsection on the testing of nuclear devices.79
Section 669 governs transfers of nuclear enrichment technologies
and contains two subsections. The first subsection states that no funds
under the Foreign Assistance Act may be provided to any nation that on
or after August 4, 1977 delivers or receives nuclear enrichment equip-
ment, materials, or technology from another country, unless before deliv-
75. HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 226; L. SPECTOR, supra note 3,
at 78, 447-50. The group also developed a special "trigger list" of items whose export is not
permitted unless special licenses are issued and the recipient nation agrees to IAEA safeguards
on the facility using these items. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 332-34. For a copy of the
guidelines, see U.S. Plutonium Use Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Arms Control,
International Security and Science, and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1935).
The Nuclear Suppliers Group was modeled after the Zangger Committee. The Zangger
Committee was established by exporters or potential exporters of commercial nuclear technol.
ogy and materials after the NPT came into force to define the procedures and standards that
they would apply to nuclear transfers to non-nuclear weapons states. L. SPECTOR, supra note
3, at 446-47.
76. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 79.
77. International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329,
§ 305, 90 Stat. 729, 755-56 (1976) (current version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2429-2429a (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)).
78. International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 12, 91 Stat. 614,
620-21 (1977) (current version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2429-2429a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
79. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No 97-113,




ery the supplier and recipient countries place these items under
multilateral auspices when available and the recipient country enters into
a full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 0
The second subsection has two key provisions. First, the President
can waive the cutoff if he certifies in writing to Congress that the termi-
nation of such assistance will have a "serious adverse effect on vital
United States interest[s]" and "he has received reliable assurances that
the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons."
81
Second, if within thirty calendar days after receiving certification Con-
gress disapproves of furnishing assistance by a concurrent resolution, the
certification will cease to be effective and all aid will end.8 2
Section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act regulates plutonium
reprocessing transfers and the receipt or use of nuclear weapons by for-
eign nations. Subsection (a) stipulates that no funds under the Act may
be provided to any country which on or after August 4, 1977 delivers or
receives nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology from
any other country, except as part of an international examination of al-
ternatives to pure plutonium reprocessing in which the United States
participates.8 3 The President may continue aid if he certifies that "termi-
nation of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achieve-
ment of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize
the common defense and security."8 4 Congress can nullify the certifica-
tion, however, by a concurrent resolution disapproving of a resumption
of assistance. as
Subsection (b) of section 670 states that no United States assistance
may be provided to any nation which "(A) transfers a nuclear explosive
device to a non-nuclear-weapon state, or (B) is a non-nuclear-weapon
state and either - (i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or (ii) detonates
a nuclear explosive device."'8 6 The President may, for not more than
thirty days of continuous session, furnish assistance that would otherwise
be cut off if he transmits to Congress "a certification that he has deter-
mined that an immediate termination of assistance to that country would
be detrimental to the national security of the United States." '87 Aid could
80. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(a) (1982).
81. Ird. § 2429(b)(1).
82. Id § 2429(b)(2)(A).
83. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). An amendment was added to
§ 2429a(a)(1) in 1985 that will be discussed later in the article.
84. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(a)(2) (1982).
85. Id. § 2429a(a)(3).
86. Id § 2429a(b)(1).
87. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(b)(2)(A) (1982).
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not continue past the thirty day period unless approved by a joint resolu-
tion of Congress and upon the same Presidential certification as con-
tained in section 670(a).18
A comparison between the cutoff provisions of sections 669 and
670(a) reveals that the language of section 669 relating to nuclear enrich-
ment transfers is less restrictive than the language of section 670(a) con-
cerning reprocessing transfers. Nuclear enrichment transfers will not
trigger termination of United States assistance to the nations engaged in
the exchange if the recipient nation agrees to place the enrichment com-
ponents, along with all its nuclear fuel and facilities, under IAEA safe-
guards.8 9 Section 670(a) does not contain a similar exemption. The only
exception to a cutoff for receipt or delivery of reprocessing technology is
if the transfer is part of an international effort, in wh:ich the United States
participates, to find alternatives to plutonium reprocessing.9"
The stricter language on plutonium reprocessing reflects the thesis
held in Congress and by the Ford and Carter Administrations that pluto-
nium reprocessing posed significant dangers to the nonproliferation re-
gime.91 As a practical matter, the broader exception of Section 669 will
probably never be applied. A nation seeking weapons capability and im-
porting enrichment technology would not agree to full scope IAEA safe-
guards in order to avoid an aid cutoff. The nations posing the greatest
proliferation risks today have rejected the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and operate nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards. 92
Ironically, the experience with Pakistan has proven the Presidential
certification provision of section 669 to be more rigorous than the provi-
sion contained in section 670(a). To override an aid cutoff triggered by a
nuclear enrichment transfer, the President must certify to Congress both
that the termination of aid would have serious adverse affects on vital
United States interests and that he has received "reliable assurances"
that the recipient nation is not developing nuclear weapons.93 To con-
tinue United States assistance after a nuclear reprocessing transfer, the
President need only certify that United States interests would be serl-
88. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(b)(3) (1982).
89. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(a) (1982).
90. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
91. See J. PILAT & W. DONNELLY, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY FOR
PREVENTING THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS CRS-95 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 83-94 S,
May 6, 1983); L. DUNN, supra note 3, at 33; Smith & Rathjens, supra note 31, at 877.
92. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
93. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b)(1) (1982).
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ously prejudiced by an aid cutoff.94 Because the Reagan Administration
could not receive "reliable assurances" from the government of President
Zia-ul Haq that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons, the Ad-
ministration was forced to request from Congress specific waivers of sec-
tion 669 in 1981 and 1987 as part of its two aid packages for Pakistan.95
Sections 669 and 670(a) grant Congress the authority to revoke a
Presidential certification by concurrent resolution. A concurrent resolu-
tion is a form of legislative veto. It requires only that both chambers of
Congress approve the legislation before the legislation becomes law. By
virtue of the Supreme Court's holding in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the concurrent resolutions are undoubtedly unconsti-
tutional.16 Even so, Congress could refuse to appropriate aid in subse-
quent fiscal years.97
Chadha does not affect section 670(b), relating to the receipt or use
of a nuclear device, because the section does not contain a legislative
veto. The section itself limits the President's authority to override an aid
cutoff. Congress determined that a transfer of an atomic device to or
explosion by a NNWS would be so grave an event that the President can
only delay the cutoff of assistance for thirty days. After thirty days, the
aid would automatically expire. It could only be restored if the President
certified to Congress that termination of assistance would be seriously
prejudicial to United States interests and both houses of Congress ap-
proved the assistance. 98
Under pressure from Congress after the passage of the Symington
Amendment and faced with criticism from presidential candidate Jimmy
Carter, President Ford in October 1976 announced that the United
States would defer the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium from ci-
vilian nuclear power plants.99 The decision sent shock waves throughout
94. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(a)(2) (1982). One of the purposes of the Glenn Amendment, which
modified the waiver language of the Symington Amendment, was "to toughen the provisions
dealing with reprocessing transfers." S. REP. No. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1977).
95. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 129-30. See also infra notes 180-81, 226 and accom-
panying text.
96. 462 U.S. 919 (1982). See Note, Nuclear Nonproliferation Legislation After Chadha:
Nonjusticiable Political Questions and the Loss of the Legislative Veto, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV.
899, 900-01 (1986).
97. Cronin, supra note 3, at 79; Note, supra note 96, at 917.
98. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(b)(2)-(3) (1982). See L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 93, 365 n.73.
99. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978, at 917, 919 (1979) [hereinafter
LEGIS. HIST.] (Oct. 28, 1976 statement of President Ford on United States nuclear energy
policy). President Ford's statement followed a recommendation of a Ford Foundation study.
NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 333.
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nuclear programs worldwide. If commercial reprocessing was not eco-
nomic in the world's largest nuclear power producing state, it was absurd
for Pakistan."° European and Japanese policymakers feared that the
United States was seeking to sabotage their plans for plutonium reproces-
sing and development of breeder reactors. 0 1
C. Carter Administration
In April 1977, President Carter announced his Administration's
policies on proliferation and nuclear power. The United States would
now indefinitely defer commercial reprocessing and recycling of pluto-
nium and continue to embargo the export of enrichment and reproces-
sing technology. President Carter also called for the establishment of an
international fuel cycle evaluation (INFCE) to deal with nuclear
problems. 102
Depicted as a bold shift in policy, the Carter program actually rep-
resented a continuation of the Ford policy. President Carter added a
sense of urgency to nonproliferation issues. This benefit, however, was
diluted by contradictory and confusing Administration statements and
antagonism generated with Western allies and Third World nations on
nuclear issues.1 3 The Carter Administration focused its attention "on
preventing the spread of the technical capabilities necessary to produce
nuclear weaponry, [in particular plutonium reprocessing,] and proffered
technical measures "fixes" to reduce the dangers of proliferation."
' 't 4
The Administration can claim success for the creation of a de facto ban
on the future export of enrichment and reprocessing facilities by supplier
nations, which is still in effect. Praise for this effort must be qualified
since it was the result of economic and other political reasons as much as
Carter policy.105
The INFCE was at the heart of the Carter policy. Sixty-six nations
came together from 1978 to 1980 to analyze the technical issues of com-
100. Ebinger, US Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy: The Pakistan Controversy, 8 FLETCHtER
F. 1, 16 (1979). See Betts, India, Pakistan and Iran in NONPROLIFERATION AND U.S. FOR-
EIGN POLICY 83, 102 (J. Yager ed. 1980); Cronin, supra note 3, at 69.
101. Ebinger, supra note 26, at 60-61.
102. LEGIS. HIST., supra note 99, at 937, 937-38 (Apr. 7, 1977 statement of President
Carter on nuclear power policy).
103. Lellouche, supra note 47, at 47-49. See also Clausen, U.S. Nuclear Exports and the
Nonproliferation Regime in LIMITING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 3, at 183, 192-
95; Smith & Rathjens, supra note 31, at 880-85.
104. J. PILAT & W. DONNELLY, supra note 91, at CRS-89.
105. Lellouche, supra note 47, at 48-49.
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mercial nuclear power."' The Administration hoped that a consensus
could be reached on the risks involved in plutonium reprocessing,
thereby muting opposition and criticism of United States policy.
10 7
Before the first plenary conference of the INFCE convened, the
United States enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of
1978.101 The Act was a compromise between provisions meant to
strengthen United States reliability as a supplier of commercial nuclear
technology and materials and requirements imposing severe unilateral
conditions on American nuclear exports." 9
Title I states that it shall be United States national policy to take
such action as necessary for the United States to provide a reliable supply
of nuclear fuel. 110 Title II commits the United States to strengthen the
IAEA safeguards system.1 ' Title III amends the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 by requiring an export license, based upon certain statutory criteria,
for United States nuclear assistance and supplies."12 Among the criteria
for an export license, Section 305 of Title III provides that the recipient
nation pledge not to use the United States material for the development
of a nuclear explosive device, not to reprocess or transfer United States-
supplied fuel without prior approval, and to place all of their peaceful
nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards." 3 Last, the Act imposed
upon the President the obligation to renegotiate all existing nuclear coop-
eration agreements to make them, conform with the Act's export
criteria.
14
The NNPA was a clear effort by Congress to constrain the executive
branch's discretion in formulating nonproliferation policy" 5 and to
reshape the Western World's nuclear energy activities."16 The demand
to retroactively revise nuclear cooperation agreements generated opposi-
106. Nye, supra note 22, at 24-25.
107. See id. See also Nuclear Proliferation: The Situation In Pakistan And India: Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1979) [hereinafter Situation in
Pakistan] (prepared statement of Thomas Pickering, Asst. Secretary of State for Oceans and
Int'l Environmental and Scientific Affairs); Gummet, supra note 38, at 553-55.
108. Pub. L. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 and 42
U.S.C.)
109. Smith & Rathjens, supra note 31, at 878.
110. 22 U.S.C. § 3221 (1982).
111. Id § 3241.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(a) (1982).
113. Id § 2156.
114. Id § 2153c.
115. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 37.
116. Cf. W. WALKER & M. L3NNROTH, supra note 23, at 146.48. Canada and the United
States "unilaterally applied further restrictions [than contained in the Nuclear Suppliers'
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tion worldwide117 and seriously undermined any opportunity to reach a
consensus at the INFCE.
The glaring contradiction between compelling renegotiation and
strengthening United States reliability as a supplier of nuclear materials
actualized when President Carter sought to ship United States nuclear
fuel to India, which refused to accept full-scope safeguards, after the pe-
riod for renegotiation of nuclear cooperation agreements expired in 1980.
Under a 1963 agreement, the United States was obligated to provide fuel
to India. President Carter exercised special waiver provisions of the Act
to permit the fuel export. Although the House strongly voted to override
the waiver, the Senate barely approved the President's waiver and the
fuel shipments were permitted.118
When the final reports of the INFCE were issued in 1980, support
existed for almost every type of nuclear program. For example, the
INFCE concluded that recycling plutonium in existing reactors was not
economical, but nations which decided to do so were perfectly justified in
using plutonium reprocessing as a means for supply self-sufficiency.1
19
Although the INFCE failed to produce a global consensus on the United
Guidelines] to their exports and tried to persuade other suppliers to fall into line, so that a
coherent restrictive regime could be established." Id. at 146.
President Carter signed NNPA on March 10, 1978 and commended the legislation as
taking "a major step forward in clarifying our Nation's [nonproliferation] policy." LEOIs.
HisT., supra note 99, at 908, 908 (Remarks of President Carter on Mar. 10, 1978 at the bill
signing ceremony). One year earlier though, President Carter stated that the new criteria for
United States nuclear exports "could force an immediate moratorium on U.S. nuclear exports,
adversely affecting" nuclear relations with United States allies. Id. at 942, 943 (Apr. 28, 1977
message of President Carter on the proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977).
117. W. WALKER & M. LONNROTH, supra note 23, at 39; Goheen, supra note 30, at 210.
In addition to the perception that the United States was seeking to unilaterally rewrite the
"rules" of the commercial nuclear trade, many nations which had nuclear cooperation and
supply agreements with the United States objected to NNPA because they had been assured by
the Carter Administration that these agreements would not be disrupted during the INFCE.
See Situation In Pakistan, supra note 107, at 9 (prepared statement of Thomas Pickering).
118. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 39, 350 n.57; Clausen, supra note 81, at 196. See Presi-
dent's Message to Congress Transmitting Executive Order on Export of Special Nuclear Mate-
rial and Components to India, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1137 (June 19, 1980).
Subsequently, it became clear the United States could no longer provide nuclear fuel to
India because of mounting Congressional opposition. India threatened to terminate the 1963
agreement and remove its reactors from IAEA safeguards. The deadlock was broken in 1982.
France agreed to serve as a substitute supplier of nuclear fuel and India agreed to maintain
IAEA safeguards and not reprocess the spent fuel. L. SPECTOIR, supra note 3, at 39-40;
Goheen, supra note 30, at 198-200. For an analysis of possible future legal conflict between the
United States and India when the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement expires in 1993, see
Millholin, supra note 6, at 593.
119. Gummet, supra note 38, at 558-59. Moreover, no one nuclear fuel cycle was seen as
less or more resistant to proliferation. Id. at 561.
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States positions, it was beneficial in fostering a greater understanding of
the dangers of proliferation. 2 ' Yet in America, the Iranian crisis and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan overshadowed the final reports. During
the last year of President Carter's term, nonproliferation assumed a
lower foreign policy priority compared to countering Soviet aggression
and perceived strategic interests in South Asia. '21
D. Reagan Administration
President Reagan established his Administration's nonproliferation
policy for his entire term of office in a speech delivered on July 16, 1981.
The speech delineated "basic guidelines" for United States policy:'
(1) prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was a fundamental national
security and foreign policy objective;
(2) strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons and
promote regional and global stability and the legitimate security needs of
other states;
(3) continue to support adherence to the NPT and work to strengthen
the IAEA safeguards system;
(4) continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equip-
ment and technology and to seek full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condi-
tion on new nuclear supply commitments;
(5) reestablish the United States as a reliable nuclear trading partner
under adequate safeguards; and
(6) cooperate with other nations by not inhibiting foreign commercial
reprocessing and breeder reactor development "in nations with advanced
nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation
risk."
123
In October 1981, President Reagan released a statement on domes-
tic nuclear power with implications for nonproliferation policy. Presi-
dent Reagan lifted the indefinite ban on commercial reprocessing
activities in the United States and strongly endorsed commercial use of
plutonium in nuclear power generation and the development of breeder
reactor technology.124
Some commentators maintained that the Reagan nonproliferation
120. See Nye, supra note 22, at 25.
121. Clausen, supra note 103, at 195-96. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
122. President's Statement on Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 768, 769 (July 16, 1981).
123. Id. at 770.
124. President's Statement Announcing a Series of Policy Initiatives, 17 WEEKLY CaMP.
PREs. Doc. 1101, 1102 (Oct. 8, 1981).
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policy constituted a fundamental shift from the Carter policy.125 Actu-
ally, despite the wide differences between the two administrations in style
and on certain substantive policy issues, the Reagan Administration gen-
erally subscribed to the basic United States nonproliferation policy in
place since the last year of the Ford Administration: withholding the
transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and refusing to cooperate in nu-
clear trade relations, except under full-scope safeguards. 126 Further-
more, the impact of the two administrations on the nonproliferation
regime has been similar. Except for Egypt and North Korea, which rati-
fied the NPT in 1981 and 1988 respectively, the same nations that were
considered proliferation risks in 1980 are still considered the greatest
risks: India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil. 127
On domestic issues, President Reagan's encouragement of nuclear
power did not aide the industry. By 1987, power companies were avoid-
ing nuclear energy, 128 and notwithstanding President Reagan's October
125. See, eg. Cross & Smith, The Reagan Administration's NonProliferation NonPolicy, 33
CATH. U.L. REV. 633, 640 (1984).
126. W. WALKER & M. L6NNROTH, supra note 23, at 155 ("Fundamentally, US policy
therefore remains one of denial, of refusal to co-operate except under the strictest terms and
with its most reliable allies, of confrontation with transgressors. A stronger element of prag-
matism may have crept in, but it has not moved far from the Carter administration's position
at the end of its stay in office."). See COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & ARMS
CONTROL, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 237 (National Academy of
Sciences, 1985) [hereinafter COMMITTEE].
127. See COMMITTEE, supra note 126, at 266.
Many factors help explain this statement. First, the nature of the problem ensures a fair
degree of continuity in United States nonproliferation policy. See HARVARD NUCLEAR
STUDY GROUP, supra note 3, at 227-28. The initial Carter policy changed by the end of his
term. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Congressional opposition to many Reagan
proposals was stiff and Congress successfully altered or defeated many of them. W. WALKER
& M. L6NNROTH, supra note 23, at 154. In turn, the Reagan Administration policies evolved
to include a greater recognition of the risks of proliferation. Schlesinger, supra note 39, at x;
W. WALKER & M. L6NNROTH, supra note 23, at 154. Of course, President Reagan himself,
while seeking the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1980, said that he did not think
foreign countries' developing their own nuclear weapons was "any of our business." Lindsey,
Reagan Says America Should Not Bar Others From A-Bomb Output, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1980,
at A12, col. 6.
Another factor explaining why the impact of the two administrations on the nonprolifera-
tion regime has been substantially the same is that the NNPA is the cornerstone of American
nonproliferation policy and greatly limits executive branch action. See US. Nuclear Non-
proliferation Policy, supra note 3 at 17 (testimony of James Devine, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology). Last, poor economics of nuclear power,
the Third World debt, and the Chernobyl disaster have reversed the fortunes of nuclear energy
around the world. See id. at 25 (statement of Joseph Nye); Clausen, supra note 81, at 201-02;
Davidson, Nuclear Power Haunted by Chernobyl's Fallout, S.F. Examiner, Dec. 1, 1987, at Al,
col. 1.
128. Going for Broke, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1987, at 32-33.
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1981 statement, it was the policy of the Department of Energy not to
pursue commercial plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactor
development. 129
In terms of nonproliferation policy, the major elements of the Rea-
gan policy were a case-by-case review of each nation, strengthening the
United States as a reliable supplier, approving plutonium reprocessing in
certain nations, and using a carrot and stick policy to curb proliferation.
While it was easy to criticize the Reagan Administration as not hav-
ing a nonproliferation policy, 130 this characterization was based upon the
philosophy that a uniform nonproliferation policy was necessary. 13' The
NNPA codified this view and the Carter Administration preferred to
treat all nations alike. The Reagan Administration policy discriminated
in its treatment of foreign nations based upon the proliferation risks pres-
ent. Differences with the Carter policy should not be overemphasized
since the Carter policy was subject to many exceptions and was arguably
abandoned by the end of President Carter's term.
132
It has been longstanding policy for the United States to provide a
reliable source of nuclear fuel and technology so that the United States
can further its nonproliferation goals. 133 The Carter Administration em-
phasized reliable supply, but only to those nations that would agree to
the export restrictions of the NNPA. The Reagan Administration did
not ask Congress to amend the Act.134 Instead, it used loopholes in the
NNPA to sell or allow sales of United States nuclear exports to safe-
guarded facilities in NPT rejectionist states.
135
129. Nuclear Non-Proliferation, supra note 5, at 45 (testimony of Ambassador Richard
Kennedy). At the close of the Reagan Administration, defense-related spending accounted for
60% of the Department of Energy budget. Even research programs in advanced commercial
nuclear reactors were sacrificed for "Star Wars" research and military nuclear projects.
Woutat, Defense to Remain Focus at Energy DepL, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 1989, pt. IV, at
1, col. 1.
130. For such a view, see Cross & Smith, supra note 125, at 633 n. 1.
131. Interview with Dr. Charles K. Ebinger, Director of the Energy Analysis Group, Inter-
national Resources Group, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 1988) [hereinafter Ebinger
Interview].
132. See CoMMrTTEE, supra note 126, at 239-41; J. PiLAT & W. DONNELLY, supra note
91, at CRS-90; Clausen, supra note 103, at 194-96.
133. See LEGiS. HIS., supra note 99, at 919 (Statement of President Ford).
134. J. PILAT & W. DONNELLY, supra note 91, at CRS-90, 96-97.
135. See Cross & Smith, supra note 125, at 650-55. Notably, the Reagan Administration
permitted Westinghouse to sell technical services to South Africa's Koeburg reactor and al-
lowed West Germany to transfer 143 tons of United States origin heavy water to Argentina.
The Administration argued that these and other transfers to nations not accepting full-scope
IAEA safeguards would improve the environment for nonproliferation and serve as induce-
ments to wider application of safeguards. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 215-16, 302-03, 336.
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The Congressional reaction to these sales was hostile. In 1984, both
house of Congress approved amendments to the Export Administration
Act to close the loopholes in the NNPA which permitted the controver-
sial transfers.136 Congress failed to pass the Export Administration Act
in 1984. By the time it was signed into law a year later, the Act no
longer included provisions restricting United States nuclear exports., 37
Over time, the Reagan Administration, for the most part, chose not to
exploit the loopholes in the NNPA and adhered to -the position that non-
proliferation restrictions required by governments were essential to na-
tional security interests and the "long-term stability of nuclear trade."138
The most striking difference between the Reagan and Carter policies
centered on their attitudes toward plutonium reprocessing. For the
Carter Administration, expanded plutonium reprocessing posed grave
dangers to the nonproliferation regime.139 In his July 1981 statement,
President Reagan announced that the United States would not inhibit
reprocessing in economically advanced nations that posed no risk of
proliferation."4 Furthermore, "programmatic" approval was given to
Sweden and Norway in 1983, and later to Japan, to reprocess United
States origin spent fuel for thirty years without review or renegotiation
by the United States.1 4' The differences should not be exaggerated be-
tween the two Administrations because the Carter Administration had
been moving toward a programmatic approval formula with Japan and
Western Europe in 1980.142
The final major element of the Reagan nonproliferation policy was
136. L. SPEcTOR, supra note 3, at 336-37.
137. Congress Renews Export Administration Act, 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 259-60 (1985).
138. McGoldrick, Problems of Assurance of Nuclear Supplies, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1987,
at 48, 48-5 1.
139. J. PILAT & W. DONNELLY, supra note 91, at CRS-94-95; Clausen, supra note 103, at
197-98.
140. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
141. See Proxmire, Congress Must Act on Proliferation, BULL. ATOM. Sci., Mar. 1985, at
32, 33; 133 CONG. REC. H9841-42 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1987) (letter from President Reagan to
Congress).
The controversy surrounding the agreements with Sweden and Norway centered upon
whether allowing thirty-year blanket approval for plutonium reprocessing was in violation of
Section 401 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The section stipulates that no bilateral
nuclear agreements shall be undertaken unless the cooperating party guarantees that no mate-
rial transferred pursuant to the agreement shall be "reprocessed, enriched or... otherwise
altered in form or content without the prior approval of the United States." 42 US.C.
§ 2153(a)(7) (1982). Critics of the administration argued that "prior approval" meant prior
approval was needed by the United States each time a nation chose to reprocess spent fuel. See
Note, supra note 96, at 899.
142. J. PILAT & W. DONNELLY, supra note 91, at CRS-96; Clausen, supra note 103, at 198,
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the use of a carrot and stick policy. The theory was that offers of eco-
nomic and military aid (carrots) could improve the security of NNWS
and reduce their motivations to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.
Otherwise, the United States would impose economic sanctions and em-
bargo nuclear technology exports (the sticks). 4 3 For Pakistan, the pol-
icy failed. Pakistan accepted American arms and economic aid while
aggressively pursuing the nuclear weapons option. 144
IV. PAKISTAN'S DRIVE FOR A NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CAPABILITY
A. Key Factors in Pakistan's Decision to Pursue
a Nuclear Weapons Capability
The Pakistani nuclear program is primarily a response to its hostil-
ity with India. India has four times the population of Pakistan and is
militarily and economicaly superior to Pakistan. Three wars between In-
dia and Pakistan have scarred the period since independence in 1947 and
the combatants still share a disputed border.1 45 Pakistanis believe that if
India has a nuclear bomb, Pakistan must have one also.1 46 Moreover,
the Pakistani nuclear program receives great support from the general
population.147
For the near future, it appears to be in Pakistan's self-interest not to
test a nuclear device. Over the last several years, Pakistan has quietly
become the third largest United States foreign aid recipient, behind Israel
143. See Note, Nuclear Non-Proliferation for the 80s Carrot and Stick Policy Reexamined,
13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 25, 26-27 (1987). The military assistance percentage of United
States foreign aid dramatically increased under the Reagan Administration. Military pro-
grams grew to over one-third of total obligations for the first time in 1982 and for 1986 they
represented 38%, or S6 billion, of the United States aid program. Trends in Foreign Aid 1977-
86: Study Prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Re-
search Service for the House Select Committee on Hunger, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1986).
144. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 46; Marwah, India and Pakistan: Nuclear Rivals in
South Asia, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: BREAKING THE CHAIN, supra note 3, at 165, 179.
145. See R. HARDGRAVE, JR., INDIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN A DEVELOPING
NATION 240-43 (3d ed. 1980); TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 25-33, 38-40; Gandhi's Visit to
Pakistan Raises Hopes of Better 7es, Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 29,
1988, at 6A, col. 4; Hussain, Why Pakistan Needs a Nuclear Option, Wash. Post, Jul. 29, 1987,
at A1o, col. 1.
146. W. DONNELLY, PAKISTAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS CRS-6 (Cong. Res. Ser. Issue
Brief 86110, Aug. 12, 1987). For detailed examinations of the presumed benefits and potential
disadvantages of a nuclear armed Pakistan and India, see TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 56-68;
STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 15-17.
147. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 16. See Haqqani, The Perils of Open Diplomacy,
Wall St. J., May 5, 1987, at 36, col. 4.
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
and Egypt.148 An ambiguous program avoids a United States aid cutoff
that would be required under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 if Paid-
stan tested a nuclear device.149 While threats of an aid cutoff have not
halted Pakistan's program, United States aid has been one factor in de-
terring Pakistan from testing a nuclear device.15 0
Irrespective of the possibility of a United States aid cutoff, an overt
nuclear posture by Pakistan could unite India, Iran, and the Soviet
Union to take action against Pakistan. India is far superior to Pakistan
in nuclear technologies and would certainly move to integrate nuclear
weapons into its armed forces.151 Consequently, it appears that Pakistan
is following the Israeli model of proliferation: developing a weapons ca-
pability and, one day, stockpiling nuclear bombs without openly declar-
ing their possession or testing them.1
52
B. History of the Pakistani Nuclear Effort and the United States
Response
1. Early History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's nuclear program began in 1955 with the creation of a
committee of scientists to advise the government on nuclear matters.
From this committee, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was
founded in 1956' Under "Atoms-for-Peace," Pakistani scientists were
trained in foreign universities and nuclear research facilities and Pakistan
148. Madison, The Pakistan Conduit, 1987 NAT'L J. 1773, 1773.
149. W. DONNELLY, supra note 146, at CRS-6.
150. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 11. See Haqqani, supra note 147, at 36.
151. W. DONNELLY, supra note 146, at CRS-6; L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 104-05.
A significant factor which may also contribute to Pakistan's decision not to test a nuclear
device is the possibility that Pakistan does not need to test nuclear weapons because it has
reportedly received tested designs from China. See Albright, Bombs Without Test Blasts?,
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, June 1987, at 32, 32.
On April 27, 1987, the Indian Minister of Defense told Parliament that "[t]he emerging
nuclear threat to us from Pakistan is forcing us to review our options." 133 CoNe. REc.
56219 (daily ed. May 8, 1987). See India Reviewing Nuclear Policy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1987,
at A6, col. 5.
Of course, India's security concerns are not solely a function of Pakistan's nuclear activi-
ties. Underlying India's insistence on maintaining a nuclear-weapons option are potential nu-
clear threats from China to anxieties about American and Soviet intervention in South Asia,
coupled with India aspirations to be a regional superpower. TAsx FORCE, supra note 6, at 2.
152. Nuclear Non-Proliferation, supra note 5, at 14 (testimony of Leonard Spector). This
statement assumes Israel has not tested nuclear weapons. A great controversy exists, beyond
the purposes of this note, as to whether Israel and South Africa tested a nuclear device In the
South Atlantic in 1979. For a discussion of the issue, see L. SPI!cTOR, supra note 3, at 299-
300, 453-57; Gaffney, Prisoners of Fear: A Retrospective Look at the Israeli Nuclear Program,
AM.-ARAB AFF., Fall 1987, at 75, 90-92.
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received a small United States-made research reactor supplied by the
IAEA.153
Kanupp, Pakistan's first, and to date only, nuclear power reactor,
began operations in 1972. The Canadian-supplied reactor uses natural
uranium as its fuel. The reactor produces an estimated fifty-five kilo-
grams of plutonium each year and is under IAEA safeguards. Kanupp
has never operated at full capacity due to Canada's cutoff of technical
assistance and fuel, which followed Pakistan's refusal to agree to full-
scope IAEA safeguards.
154
Although the IAEA declared in September 1981 that it could not
guarantee that diversions from Kanupp were not occurring and the
IAEA did not believe the safeguards at the reactor were functioning
properly until 1983, experts doubt any diversions of spent fuel took
place.155 Instead, Pakistan obtained fissile material through its own pro-
duction of highly enriched uranium.
2. The Role of Zulfikar Bhutto and Pakistan's Two Track
Approach To Nuclear Weapons Capability
The father of the Pakistani bomb was Zulfikar Bhutto.15 6 From the
outset of Pakistan's nuclear program to his ouster from power in 1977,
Bhutto dominated Pakistan's nuclear decision-making process.15 7 Under
Bhutto's guidance, Pakistan refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, linking its decision to India's refusal to sign the treaty.15 8 The
actual Pakistani decision to develop a nuclear bomb, however, predated
153. See L. Spector, supra note 3, at 70-71.
154. Id. at 71, 81, 95. See Ebinger, supra note 100, at 10-11.
155. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 93-95. Pakistan has one small reprocessing facility
known as New Labs at Rawalpindi which is not under international safeguards. To date,
Pakistan has not reprocessed spent fuel. If Pakistan were to engage in reprocessing, this would
constitute a breach of its international obligations because all of Pakistan's spent fuel is under
IAEA safeguards and may not be reprocessed at unsafeguarded facilities. Id. at 105, 109;
Telephone interview with Leonard S. Spector, (Feb. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Spector Interview].
156. While awaiting execution in 1978, Bhutto described his overriding objective for Paid-
stan's nuclear program: "[w]hen I took charge of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission it
was no more than a signboard of an office. It was only a name. Assiduously and with granite
determination, I put my entire vitality behind the task of acquiring nuclear capability for my
country.. ." L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 72 (quoting Z. BHuTTo, "IF I AM ASSASSI-
NATED. .. " 137-38 (1979)). Bhutto is more known for a comment he allegedly made in 1965,
"[ilf India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of
our own. We have no alternative." S. WEiSSMAND & H. KRONSNEY, THE ISLAMIC BOMB
161 (1981).
157. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 71-72; Cronin, supra note 3, at 70.
158. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 73. Following the Indian test, Bhutto proposed that the
United Nations declare South Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Ebinger, supra note 100, at 7.
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the 1974 Indian test. It apparently came in 1971 after Pakistan's defeat
at the hands of India in the second Indo-Pakistani War and was made by
Bhutto to a group of scientists following his elevation to Prime
Minister. 159
In the early 1970s, Pakistan adopted a two-track approach to obtain
the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons. Prior to the October
1973 OAPEC oil embargo, Pakistan commenced negotiations with
France to purchase a large, commercial plutonium reprocessing facility.
With only the small scale Kanupp reactor generating electricity, there
was no economic justification for Pakistan to have a reprocessing facility
with such a grossly excessive capacity. To counter criticism of the pro-
ject, Islamabad drafted grandiose plans for a major expansion in its nu-
clear reactor program. Despite the criticism, Pakistan and France signed
a contract for construction of the facility in 1974, to be located at
Chashma ("the Chashma facility")."1°
Following India's test, Pakistan pursued a second route to a bomb
capability through clandestine purchases and smuggling of technologies
for the construction of a uranium enrichment facility. Pakistani agents
founded dummy corporations in Western Europe, the United States and
Japan. The agents circumvented the Nuclear Suppliers' "trigger list" by
purchasing items either not on the list or, if on the l:ist, their components
and subcomponents.161
Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan was the mastermind of this international
effort. As an engineer for a Dutch firm engaged in the construction of an
enrichment plant in Europe, he stole technical data on the enrichment
process and detailed lists of the key components used in the facility. Dr.
Khan later returned to Pakistan and supervised the construction of an
enrichment plant at Kahuta ("the Kahuta facility"). 162
3. The Exercise of United States Leverage
Prior to the passage of the original Symington Amendment, the
Ford Administration reversed its position on the Chashma facility and
sought to stop the sale. 63 The Carter Administration stepped up Ameri-
159. S. WEISSMAN & H. KRONNEY, supra note 156, at 42-46.
160. See L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 74; Ebinger, supra note 100, at 3-4.
161. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 75-76, 81-82, 333-34; Marwah, supra note 144, at 169-70.
162. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 75-76. See Nayar, We have the A-Bomb, Says Pakistant's
'Dr. Strangelove', The Observor (London), Mar. 1, 1987, at 13, col. 1. ("[Iin an extraordinary
frank aside, Khan made clear that Pakistan would be prepared to beg, borrow or steal
whatever was required for its nuclear programme.").
163. See Ebinger, supra note 100, at 13. The Ford Administration appeared to have
reached a compromise with France in early 1976. In exchange for Pakistan's agreement to
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can opposition. Nevertheless, France and Pakistan continued with the
project. In response, the Carter Administration terminated United
States foreign aid to Pakistan in September 1977, though without for-
mally invoking section 670(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act.'" A
change in French policymakers on nuclear affairs and clear evidence that
President Zia, who overthrew Prime Minister Bhutto in July 1977, in-
tended to produce nuclear weapons, led France to cancel the contract
with Pakistan in August 1978. The Administration restored aid two
months later.
165
While world attention was focused on the Chashma facility, Paki-
stan had quietly succeeded in importing uranium enrichment equipment
and technology to construct the Kahuta facility. 1 6 When its existence
became known, the United States sent a high level State Department
team to Islamabad to convince President Zia to dismantle the project.
The effort failed. On April 6, 1979, President Carter invoked section 669
of the Foreign Assistance Act and terminated all United States aid to
Pakistan.
167
The aid cutoff backfired on the United States. Pakistani scientists
continued to work on the Kahuta facility and to covertly acquire items
for it.' 68 The amount of aid cancelled, approximately 60 million dollars,
was not enough to dissuade Pakistan from developing a weapons capabil-
ity and was more than offset by monies from Western European and
OPEC nations.1 69 The cutoff triggered an "emotional response [in Paki-
stan] emphasizing that [its] sovereignty would not be sold." °70 United
States intelligence services reported that Pakistan was preparing a nu-
accept LABA safeguards on the Chashma facility, the United States would support the deal.
L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 78-79.
164. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 130; L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 80, 361 n.27.
165. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 80-81; Lellouche, supra note 47, at 48-49.
166. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
167. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 83. See Burt, U.S Aid to Pakistan Cut After Evidence of
Atoms Arms Plan, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1979, at Al, col. I ("[A]dministration officials regard
Pakistan's effort to produce the enriched nuclear material as nearly conclusive evidence that
the country is seeking a nuclear-weapons capability.").
Immediately after the cutoff, one commentator stated that the Carter Administration had
reluctantly decided to invoke the Symington Amendment and suggested that the Administra-
tion would, as incentives for Pakistan not to develop nuclear weapons, waive the Amendment
and "offer Zia stronger guarantees of security, increased arms sales and greater economic aid."
Barber, The Islamic Atomic Bombshell, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 27, 1979, at 12, 13.
168. Van Hollen, supra note 47, at 160.
169. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 133 n. 4.
170. Betts, Courtney, Rowen, Brody & Yager, U.S. Policy Choices, in NONPROLIFERATION
AND U.S. POLICY, supra note 100, at 308, 354.
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clear test site.1 71
4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979.
From that date, the events in Afghanistan have played a crucial role in
defining United States relations with Pakistan and India.
172
• Almost overnight, President Carter reversed his Administration's
foreign policy on Pakistan.1 73 President Carter reaffirmed a 1959 bilat-
eral security agreement with Pakistan and offered Pakistan 400 million
dollars in military and economic assistance over two years. President Zia
rejected the aid offer as "peanuts."174 Subsequently, the Administration
rethought its policy on Pakistan. National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher flew to
Islamabad on February 1, 1980 to negotiate an expanded aid package,
conditioned on Pakistani assurances not to test an atomic bomb. Mean-
while, the administration had decided to ask Congress for an exemption
of the Glenn-Symington Amendments to allow a resumption of aid for
Pakistan. 175
Leonard Spector, a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, argues that the Brzezinski-Christopher mission
marked a turning point in United States nonproliferation policy for
Pakistan:
Whereas prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Ad-
ministration had been prepared to impose economic and military aid
171. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 83.
172. Rose, United States and Soviet PolicyToward South Asia, CURRENT HIST., Mar. 1986,
at 97, 97.
173. See Weisman, U.S. Interests in South Asia Is Deepening, Cautiously, N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 1988, at E2, col. 1. President Carter spoke with President Zia "very shortly" after the
invasion and committed United States military aid to Pakistan. 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs.
Doc. 35, 35 (Jan. 7, 1980).
174. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 85. See Agreement of Cooperation Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, Mar. 5, 1959, 10
U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S. 4190; supra note 47 and accompanying text,
175. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 85. The Carter Administration intended "to enter into a
long-term military support relationship with Pakistan that extend[ed] beyond the crisis
cause[d] by the Soviet armed intervention in neighboring Afghanistan." Gwertzman, White
House Seeks Long-Term Aid To Bolster the Defense of Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1980, at
Al, col. 1.
Interestingly, the Brzezinski-Christopher mission departed for Islamabad the day after
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan stated that it was more important to help Pakistan
counter the Soviet move into Afghanistan, than to block Pakistan from developing nuclear




sanctions against Pakistan and to consider more severe measures to
stop the Pakistani nuclear weapons effort in its tracks, the United
States was now ready to maintain the flow of arms and aid even if
Pakistan continued to advance its program, provided it did not test a
nuclear device.
176
5. The Reagan Administration Aid Package of 1981
In mid-1981, the Reagan Administration reached agreement with
Islamabad on a 3.2 billion dollar, six-year aid package. The plan, evenly
divided between economic and security assistance, included the sale of
forty sophisticated F-16 jet fighters."'7 The Administration intended the
aid "to create a stronger, more self-reliant Pakistan as it confront[ed]
Soviet power in neighboring Afghanistan." 
17 8
While acknowledging the nonproliferation goals expressed in the
Glenn-Symington Amendments, the Reagan Administration criticized
the April 1979 cutoff as a failure and asked Congress for a specific waiver
of the amendments for Pakistan. Under-Secretary of State James Buck-
ley claimed that the support program would curb Pakistan's desire for
nuclear weapons by enhancing its sense of security and would provide an
opportunity for the United States to influence Pakistan's nuclear deci-
sions.1 79 He informed Congress that "President Zia has provided assur-
ances that Pakistan would not develop nuclear weapons."180 Despite
176. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 85-86.
177. Id. at 90; A Seesawing Policy on Pakistan Aid, 1987 CONG. Q. WEEKLY ReFP. 2669,
2669.
178. Aid and the Proposed Arms Sales of F-16"s to Pakistan: Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1981) [hereinafter Proposed Arms Sales]
(statement of James Buckley, Under Secretary of State for security assistance).
179. Id. at 9 (statement of James Buckley).
180. Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan: Hearings before the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1981) (testimony of James Buckley). The full state-
ment provided to Congress read as follows:
President Zia has provided assurances that Pakistan would not develop nuclear
weapons, and that Pakistan would not transfer sensitive nuclear technology or equip-
ment to other states. I accept those assurances at face value.
As you know, the United States sees no differences between a nuclear weapons
test and a peaceful nuclear explosion and we have made our position abundantly
clear to Pakistan. We believe that Pakistan nevertheless does make such a distinction
and that it may develop the capability to explode a device.
We have also made it abundantly clear to Pakistan that should it explode a
device, the effect on our relations would be most severe. We are confident that Paki-
stan has understood what we have said.
With these considerations in mind, we consider that we are not presently in a
position to exercise the existing waiver provision of the Symington amendment.
We continue to believe, however, that our national security interests would be
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President Zia's assurances, Buckley did not question that Pakistan con-
tinued to actively seek a nuclear weapons capability.18'
Congress accepted the Administration's arguments and enacted the
aid package in the International Security and Development Cooperation
Act of 1981, signed into law by President Reagan on December 29, 1981.
Section 736 of the Act amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with
a specific provision for aid to Pakistan.
182
The stated purpose of the program was "to benefit the people of
Pakistan by helping them meet the burdens imposed by the presence of
Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by promoting economic develop-
ment." 183 Congress granted the President authority to waive section 669
of the Foreign Assistance Act for Pakistan, relating to the transfer of
nuclear enrichment technology, from December 29, 1981 to September
30, 1987.184 To counterbalance the waiver of Section 699, and with Paki-
stan in mind, Congress added subsection (b) to Section 670 of the For-
eign Assistance Act, which strengthened the termination language of the
original Glenn-Symington Amendments relating to nuclear explosions by
NNWS. 1
85
On February 10, 1982, President Reagan exercised the authority
granted to him by the International Security Act to waive the prohibi-
tions of section 669 until September 30, 1987. President Reagan also
waived provisions of section 670(a) with respect to a cutoff of funds for
receipt of plutonium reprocessing technology by utilizing the "built-in"
waiver of the section.' 86 President Reagan certified to Congress that not
served by providing the President waiver authority on these grounds. We also be-
lieve that the new security relationship with Pakistan, for which a legislative change
in the Symington amendment is an essential element, provides us with the best hope
for effectively influencing Pakistani decision-making on this issue in the future.
Id. Buckley's statement explains why the Reagan Administration needed a specific exemption
for the Symington Amendment. The administration could not take advantage of the "built-in"
waiver provision of section 669 because the President could not certify he had "received relia-
ble assurances" that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons. See 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b)(1)
(1982).
181. Proposed Arms Sales, supra note 178, at 21 (testimony of James Buckley).
182. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
113, § 736, 95 Stat. 1519, 1561-62 (1981) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2375 (West Supp,
1988)).
183. 22 U.S.C. § 2375(a) (1982).
184. Id. § 2375(d) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2375(d) (West Supp. 1988)).
185. Id. § 2429a(b). See A Seesawing Policy on Pakistan Aid, supra note 177, at 2669,
186. Presidential Determination No. 82-7, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1983), reprinted in 22 U.S.CA.
§ 2375 app. at 206 (West Supp. 1988). The waiver of section 670(a) was necessary because
following the cancellation of the Chashma facility in 1978 Pakistan made clandestine
purchases of reprocessing technology. TAsK FORCE, supra note 6, at 130.
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furnishing assistance to Pakistan "would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives and otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security." 187 Provisions on termina-
tion of assistance for the testing of a nuclear device contained in section
670(b) were not waived and still apply to Pakistan.
The International Security Act codified United States policy on Pak-
istan for the beginning of the 1980s. The policy assumed that the pri-
mary interest of the United States in Pakistan was to aid the Afghan
rebels and for this it was essential that the United States to maintain
good relations with Pakistan."' Though principally designed to serve
United States strategic interests in the region, the Reagan Administration
also argued that United States assistance would also diminish Pakistan's
motivations to build a bomb. However, Pakistan's nuclear intentions
had been clear to Washington for years and by virtue of President Rea-
gan's action on February 12, 1982, Pakistan could continue in its efforts
to obtain a weapons capability without risking an American aid cutoff,
provided it did not test a nuclear device. The United States was left only
with export controls and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan as the primary
tools to curb Pakistan's nuclear program.18 9
6. Reagan Administration Successes and Failures
The Reagan Administration followed a policy of export controls and
diplomatic pressure with mixed results. The Administration was unable
to orchestrate an international embargo on the sale of nuclear technology
and material to Pakistan. Pakistan repeatedly circumvented United
States and European export controls to purchase critically important
items for its nuclear facilities.' 9°
The Administration did have its successes. After the IAEA re-
ported in 1981 that it could not guarantee diversions of spent fuel were
not occurring at Kanupp, and presented intelligence reports that Paki-
stan had constructed an indigenous reprocessing facility, the Reagan Ad-
ministration reportedly warned Islamabad in 1982 that, if Pakistan were
to reprocess any spent fuel, United States aid would be cut off.191 To
date, Pakistan has not engaged in plutonium reprocessing. 192
187. Presidential Determination No. 82-7, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1983), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 2375 app. at 206 (West Supp. 1988).
188. Ebinger Interview, supra note 131.
189. See L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 86.
190. See id. at 89-90.
191. Id. at 96, 105-06.
192. See supra note 155.
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Equally significant, the Administration successfully blocked Is-
lamabad's plans for commercial nuclear power development. It is essen-
tial for Pakistan's economic growth that its electrical generating capacity
be expanded to reduce the nation's dependence on imported oil and meet
a projected energy shortfall. 193 The energy program of former President
Zia called for the construction of as many as five 1000-megawatt nuclear
power reactors over the next fifteen years. 194 In 1982, Pakistan solicited
international bids on a 900-megawatt reactor at Chashma. No bids were
received. Nor as of 1987 had any nation submitted a bid on the project
because of an agreement "among the major nuclear supplier countries
not to compete in markets that are controversial with respect to non-
proliferation assurances." 195
7. 1984 Events and Reagan Policy Shift
A series of disturbing events occurred in 1984 demonstrating that
the United States had not persuaded Pakistan to forego a nuclear weap-
ons program. Press accounts surfaced in 1983 and 1984 that China had
given Pakistan blueprints of tested nuclear weapons.1 96 In February
1984, Dr. Abdul Khan announced that Pakistan had achieved the capa-
bility to enrich uranium.197 Finally, in July 1984, three Pakistani nation-
als were indicted in Houston for attempting to smuggle out of the United
States electronic switches used in the firing mechanism of a nuclear
bomb. 198
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reacled quickly to these
events. It unanimously approved on March 28, 1984 an amendment au-
thored by Senators Cranston and Glenn that would have halted aid to
193. M. Khan, Atomic Energy for Economic Development, ECON. REV. (Karachi), Sept.
1986, at 145-46. "Pakistan's import bill for oil increased from $63 million in FY-1973 to
$1,419 million, (25 percent of total imports) in FY 1984. Shortages of electric power resulted
in increasingly prolonged blackouts and brownouts in major cities and rural areas." M. Wil-
liams & L. Rudel, U.S. Economic Assistance to Pakistan: Review of the Period 1982-1987
(Final Report) 89 (June 22, 1988) (available from the United States Agency for International
Development). See generally W. WALKER & M. L6NNROTH, supra note 23, at 87.
194. Khan, supra note 193, at 146.
195. Disagreement Remains With France Over Cutoff, NUCLEAR NEWS, July 1987, at 58,
58. See L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 96-97; Cronin, supra note 3, at 65. In 1988, it was
reported that France and Pakistan were negotiating the sale of a large nuclear power plant.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 42.
196. L. SPECTOR, supra note 3, at 101.
197. Id. at 98-99 ("[D]r. Abdul Qadir Khan ... announced during an interview that 'by
the grace of God, Pakistan is now among the few countries in the world that can efficiently
enrich uranium' and had 'destroyed the monopoly forever' that the advanced nations enjoyed
in this field.").
198. Id. at 100-01.
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Pakistan if the President did not certify that Pakistan neither possessed a
nuclear device nor was acquiring the means for detonating one. In-
formed by the Administration that President Reagan could not make this
certification, and fearing that a subsequent termination of aid to Pakistan
"could convince the Pakistanis that the rapid acquisition of a nuclear
device is the only way to provide for their national security," the com-
mittee reversed itself and voted eight to seven to draft a substitute
amendment. 199
The new amendment only required the President to certify that Pak-
istan did not possess a nuclear device and that United States aid will
reduce the risk Pakistan will possess a nuclear device.2co On the floor of
the Senate, the amendment was defeated and Congress appropriated eco-
nomic and security assistance for Pakistan at the level requested in the
President's fiscal year 1984 budget.201
Pressured by the Foreign Relations Committee and confronted by
Pakistan's completion of the Kahuta facility, President Reagan wrote
President Zia in September 1984 seeking assurances that Pakistan would
not enrich uranium above five percent, the point at which natural ura-
nium is no longer enriched for commercial nuclear reactors. Otherwise,
there would be grave consequences for United States-Pakistani relations.
President Zia responded with a pledge not to enrich uranium above the
five percent level.2 ' 2 The Reagan letter marked a major change from the
previous policy of limited opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program as
long as Pakistan did not detonate a nuclear device. The United States
refused to continue to acquiesce to Pakistan's nuclear activities.
20 3 If
President Zia had abided by his pledge, Pakistan would not today possess
fissile material.
199. S. REP. No. 400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1984). See L SPECTOR, supra note 3, at
102-03.
200. S. REP. No. 400, supra note 199, at 58.
201. Cronin, supra note 3, at 87 n. 63. President Reagan requested and received S525
million in security assistance for Pakistan. Security assistance includes Foreign Military Sales
loans and Economic Support Fund loans and grants, which are used to aid countries with
heavy defense costs. 'Security Aid' Total Fiscal 1984-85, 40 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 397, 397
(1984). Total United States assistance for Pakistan, including development aid, was S608.2
million for fiscal year 1984. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, U.S. OVERSEAS
LOANS AND GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, JULY 1,
1945 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1987, at 25 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS].
202. See eg., W. DONNELLY, supra note 146, at CRS-3; TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at
131; A Seesawing Policy on Pakistan Aid, supra note 177, at 2669.
203. Spector Interview, supra note 155.
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8. 1985 Congressional Action and Reagan Policy Reversal
For the first time since 1981, Congress passed a foreign aid authori-
zation bill in 1985. In previous years Congress had been unable to pass a
separate authorization bill and had lumped foreign aid along with the
other authorization bills into a single spending bill approved under a con-
tinuing resolution at the end of each year's session. 1985 also marked the
first year that Congress pared down the Reagan Administration's foreign
aid buildup.2" Economic and security assistance for Pakistan, however,
escaped the budget cuts. In fact, United States assistance increased from
the previous fiscal year to a total of 550.2 million dollars.20 5
Critics of aid for Pakistan did have two legislative victories. First,
the substitute amendment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
defeated in 1984, was revived and included in the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act of 1985. The amendment states that
no United States assistance shall be furnished nor military equipment or
technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan unless the President
certifies to Congress during the fiscal year in which assistance is to be
furnished that "Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device and that the
proposed United States assistance programs will reduce significantly the
risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.
' '2o6
The amendment does not rescind President Reagan's 1982 waivers
of sections 669 and 670(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act pertaining to
nuclear enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology transfers.
Rather, the amendment establishes in the Foreign Assistance Act an
event, possession of a nuclear device, lower on the "staircase" of prolifer-
ation than contained in section 670(b), which mandates a termination of
aid in case of a nuclear explosion.20 7 The amendment reflected Congres-
sional concern that Pakistan could receive hundreds of millions of dollars
in United States aid while covertly accumulating a nuclear weapons arse-
nal, without penalty under United States law.20 8
The amendment also functions differently than sections 669 and
670(a) and (b) because there is no event triggering a cutoff in United
States aid. Instead, the President must issue the certification for each
204. Congress Clears Foreign Aid Authorization Bill, 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 41,41 (1985).
205. 'Security Aid' Totals, Fiscal 1986-88, 1987 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 115, 115. Total
United States aid for fiscal year 1985 was $665.2 million. See U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS, supra
note 201, at 25.
206. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, § 902, 22
U.S.C. § 2375(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
207. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2429-2429a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
208. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 131-32.
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fiscal year before aid is furnished or military equipment sold and the
President does not have the authority to waive certification. While appli-
cable only to Pakistan, the scope of the amendment is broader than the
cutoff provisions since it prohibits both United States aid and military
sales, whereas sections 669 and 670(a) and (b) only restrict United States
aid.2' President Reagan transmitted the certification to Congress for fis-
cal years 1986 through 1989.210
The second accomplishment by critics of aid to Pakistan was the
addition of the Solarz Amendment to section 670(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act. Section 670(a) now contains prohibitions on transfers of
nuclear reprocessing technology and mandates an aid cutoff if a NNWS,
its agent, or person otherwise acting on behalf of the nation, on or after
August 8, 1985:
exports illegally (or attempts to export illegally) from the United States
any material, equipment, or technology which would contribute signif-
icantly to the ability of such country to manufacture a nuclear explo-
sive device, if the President determines that the material, equipment, or
technology was to be used by such country in the manufacture of a
nuclear explosive device.211
The amendment was drafted in reaction to the conviction of a Pakistani
national the preceding year for attempting to smuggle nuclear weapons
parts out of the United States
2 12
On its face, the Solarz Amendment is less restrictive than the other
cutoff provisions of sections 669 and 670(a) and (b) because it is not self-
executing. The President must first determine that the nation in question
was involved in the illegal effort. Under the other cutoff provisions, the
President's authority to furnish assistance expires upon the triggering
event.213 As in the case of plutonium reprocessing transfers, the Presi-
dent may indefinitely waive the Solarz Amendment through certification
to Congress that "termination of such assistance would be seriously prej-
udicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or
209. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2429-2429a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
210. Presidential Determination No. 86.03, 3. C.F.R. 427 (1986), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.
§ 2375(e) app. at 761 (Supp. IV 1986); Presidential Determination No. 87-3. 3 C.F.R. 275
(1987), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2375(e) app. at 761 (Supp. IV 1986); Presidential Determina-
tion No. 88-4, 3 C.F.R. 316 (1988); Presidential Determination No. 89-7, 53 Fed. Reg. 49111
(1988).
211. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, § 1204, 22
U.S.C. § 2429a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
212. See H.R. REP. No. 39, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 99 (1985); Pear, Legislators Moye on Atom
Exports, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1987, at A9, col. 1.
213. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2429-2429a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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otherwise jeopardize the common defense and secu:ty. 214
Beginning in 1985, the government of President Zia provided the
Reagan Administration "unequivocal assurances" that it would not en-
gage in any illegal smuggling activities in the United States.215 The relia-
bility of these assurances, along with President Zia's earlier assurances
that Pakistan would not develop nuclear weapons, became highly suspect
in late 1985 and early 1986 when Washington received intelligence re-
ports that Pakistan had enriched uranium to a weapons grade level.
President Zia had breached his 1984 promise to President Reagan not to
enrich uranium above the five percent level.216
At this point, the Reagan Administration was negotiating with Is-
lamabad on the broad outlines of a new aid program.217 The Adminis-
tration had to decide whether to maintain opposition to Pakistan's
nuclear enrichment activities, or to reverse itself and agree to more assist-
ance. It chose the latter position. United States nonproliferation policy
for Pakistan reverted back to the earlier policy of acquiescence, although
now modified by the certification requirement that Pakistan did not pos-
sess a nuclear device.218
9. 1987 Capitol Hill Battle Over President Reagan's Second Aid
Package to Pakistan
A series of events in 1987 placed greater attention on Pakistan's nu-
clear program. In February 1987 the American Ambassador to Pakistan
said it was "open to question" whether President Reagan could certify
for fiscal year 1988 that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device.219 In
214. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(a)(2) (1982).
215. Murphy, supra note 6, at 53.
216. Spector Interview, supra note 155. See Woodward, Pakistan Reported Near Atom
Arms Production, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
217. Murphy, FY 1988 Assistance Requests for the Middle East and South Asia, Dn!P'T ST,
BULL., May 1987, at 59, 63.
218. Spector Interview, supra note 155. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 131.
219. Nuclear Non-Proliferation, supra note 5, at 192 (text of Ambassador Deane Hinton's
speech of Feb. 16, 1987). The complete statement of Ambassador Hinton was as follows:
In 1985, Congress legislated a new annual requirement that, for our assistance pro-
gram to continue, the President must certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear
explosive device and that our aid substantially reduces the risk it will obtain one.
The President has twice so certified. For the future, I would note that it is open to
question whether the President could so certify were he to conclude that Pakistan
had in hand, but not assembled, all the needed components for a nuclear explosive
device.
Id. at 191-92. Richard Kennedy, the Reagan Administration's top official on nonproliferation
policy, sought to qualify Ambassador Hinton's remarks in testimony before Congress on Feb.
ruary 25, 1987: "Ambassador Hinton's speech simply expressed.., our longstanding concern
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March Dr. Abdul Khan boasted that Pakistan had constructed nuclear
bombs.2 20 Later in the month, President Zia stated in a Time magazine
interview that Pakistan had achieved a nuclear weapons capability, but
denied that Pakistan possessed or intended to construct nuclear weap-
ons."- 1 On July 28, 1987, a Pakistani businessman, Arshad Pervez, and a
retired Pakistani brigadier general were indicted in Philadelphia for con-
spiring to illegally obtain an export license needed to ship twenty-five
tons of maraging 350, a special steel alloy that could be used to enrich
uranium.' The same week the indictments in Philadelphia were
handed down, in an unrelated case, United States attorneys indicted two
Americans and a Hong-Kong Chinese in Sacramento for illegally export-
ing to Pakistan fifteen shipments of nuclear weapons testing equipment
between 1982 and 1983.3
President Reagan's budget for fiscal year 1988 included 290 million
dollars in military aid and 250 million dollars in economic aid for Paki-
about the direction and certain aspects of the Pakistani nuclear program. The statements...
were meant to impress on the audience the deep seriousness of these concerns." Id. at 42
(testimony of Richard Kennedy).
220. Nayar, supra note 162, at 13, col. 1. Through a statement released by the Pakistan
Embassy in Washington, D.C., Dr. Khan claimed the remarks attributed to him in the report
were false. Indian, American, and even Pakistani commentators did not doubt the accuracy of
the article. Chanda, Yes, We Have No Bomb, FAR E. ECON. REv., Mar. 12, 1987, at 34, 34.
See Nordland, A Pakistan Bombshell, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1987, at 45.
221. Munro, supra note 6, at 42. Following the interview, President Zia "vehemently de-
nied that Pakistan is capable of producing a nuclear weapon" and said his statements were
used out of context. King, No Nuclear Bomb, Zia Insists, DEF. WEEK, Apr. 6, 1987, at 10, 10.
President Zia attributed the speculation concerning his nation's nuclear activities to "a con-
spiracy directed by the 'Zionist lobby in the U.S.' and the Indian government" Id.
222. Oberdorfer, 2 Indicted in Pakistani Nuclear-Export Case, Wash. Post, July 29, 1987,
at AlO, col. 4.
The indictments resulted from the arrest of Arshad Z. Pervez, a Canadian of Pakistani
origin, on July 10, 1987 for attempting to bribe a customs official to issue an export license
needed to ship the steel. Pervez was charged with eight counts of conspiracy, bribery, false
statements, and attempted exportation of beryllium, an element used in the detonation of nu-
clear weapons. According to the indictment, Pervez was working for retired brigadier general
Inam ul-Haq. From Pakistan, Imain coordinated the importation of materials for Pakistan's
nuclear program. Id. The Pakistani government denied any connection to the conspiracy and
issued an arrest warrant for Inam. Serrill, A Bad Case of Nuclear Friction, TiME, Aug. 17,
1987, at 40, 40.
A federal jury convicted Pervez on December 17, 1987 of conspiracy, making false state-
ments to the government, and attempted exportation of beryllium. He was acquitted of brib-
ery, interstate travel in aid of racketeering and illegally seeking to obtain an export license for
the steel alloy. Lounsberry, Importer guilty of conspiracy, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 18,
1987, at 17-A, col. 6.
223. Nuke Rebuke, ASIAWEEK, Aug. 2, 1987, at 21, 21; A Wink at Proliferation, ECONo-
MIST, Aug. 15, 1987, at 23, 24.
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stan.2 24 This aid was to be the first installment of a new six year, 4.02
billion dollar aid package.225 The Administration asked Congress for an-
other six year waiver of section 699 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961. The original waiver was set to expire on September 30, 1987, at
which point United States aid would have to be terminated. 26
Richard Murphy, the Reagan Administration's top official on South
Asian Affairs, voiced almost the same arguments used by Under-Secre-
tary of State James Buckley six years earlier in urging Congress to ap-
prove the Administration's first aid request for Pakistan. Murphy told
Congress that "Pakistan plays a critical and dangerous role in opposing
Soviet aggression. '2 27 In regard to nonproliferation concerns, Murphy
repeated the claim that United States assistance strengthened United
States influence over Pakistan's nuclear activities and that a shift to "a
policy of threats and public ultimata" would be ineffective and increase
the incentives for Pakistan to possess nuclear weapons. 228
Congress' approval of the new aid package seemed assured through
the first half of 1987. Despite the statements by Dr. Khan and President
Zia, in April leading liberal Democrats joined their Republican col-
leagues on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, over the objections of the majority of the commit-
tees' Democratic members, to approve the package and reject any strict
conditions on it. However, both committees reduced the period of the
proposed waiver of section 699 from six to two years.229
224. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1988-89 (part 5): Hearings and Markup
Before the SubcommL on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. xiii, xlvii (1987) (Subcomm. Report) [hereinafter Subcomm. Markup].
The Administration also requested $80 million for P.L. 480 Title E and III programs and $50
million for developmental assistance. Id. See Felton, Military Aid - Including Contra Money
- Is Priority, 1987 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 61, 61.
225. Murphy, supra note 217, at 63.
226. See, eg., TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 129-30; Armacost, South Asia and the United
States: An Evolving Partnership, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1987, at 75, 78; Ottaway, Pakistan's
Nuclear Intentions Called Into Doubt, Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1987, at A29, col. 1. The President
could not take advantage of the "built-in" waiver of the Symington Amendment because, as
admitted by Robert Peck, Deputy Secretary of State, in a letter to Senator John Glenn, "the
United States can no longer obtain 'reliable assurances' from Pakistan that it is not producing
material for nuclear weapons." Id.
227. Murphy, supra note 217, at 63.
228. Id. at 64.
229. See Madison, supra note 148, at 1173-74; Pressman, House Panel Drafts a Pared-Down
Aid Bill, 1987 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 667, 667; Pressman, SIL) Billion for Foreign Aid Is
Approved by Senate Panel, 1987 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 786, 786.
The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs viewed an aid cutoff as the worst way to influence Pakistan's nuclear activities- "[e]very
single witness who appeared before the Subcommittee, including experts from within and with-
[Vol, 12
Pakistan and Proliferation
Pakistan's support for the Afghan rebels resisting the Soviet occupa-
tion was the crucial factor in influencing the liberal Democrats to back
the President's request.? 0 After the votes of the two committees, oppo-
nents of aid to Pakistan saw little chance of defeating the request. 31
The July indictments of the two Pakistani nationals in Philadelphia
completely changed the situation. Claiborne Pell, the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asserted that the Solarz Amend-
ment has been "'egregiously violated"' and called for the end of aid to
Pakistan.2 32 Representative Stephen Solarz, one of the liberal Democrats
who sided with the Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee's vote in April, drafted an amendment requiring that the President
certify to Congress that Pakistan was not enriching uranium above the
five percent level before aid could be provided.233
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy responded on behalf of
the Administration to the indictments in testimony before two House
subcommittees on July 22, 1987. The Administration would uphold
United States law, but Murphy reminded the members of Congress of
"our global security interests and the importance to these interests of
maintaining our support for Pakistan in its vital posture of opposition to
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 2 34 A few days later, the State
Department dispatched Under-Secretary of State Michael Armacost to
Islamabad to ask President Zia to open Pakistan's nuclear facilities to
international inspection. President Zia refused the request, though he
offered Pakistan's cooperation in the investigation of the two Pakistani
nationals.235
Congressional opposition to the aid package reached its highest
point when the Senate on July 31 and the House on August 3, 1987
passed nonbinding resolutions urging Pakistan to agree to verifiable
measures to show that it was not producing weapons-grade nuclear
out the Administration, testified that even if faced with the stark choice between U.S. assist-
ance and its nuclear program, Pakistan would forgo U.S. assistance." Subcomm. Markup,
supra note 224, at L.
230. Madison, supra note 148, at 1174 ("Not only is Pakistan supporting the Afghan
rebels, known as Mujahedeen, but it is also the conduit through which covert U.S. assistance
flows to the rebels. And it is the war in Afghanistan that supersedes the nonproliferation
question in the minds of most Members when Congress considers aid to Pakistan.").
231. Sciolino, Pakistan Aid Foes Vow Fight, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1987, at AS, col. 1.
232. Towell, Nuclear-Materials Incident Jeopardizes Aid to Pakistan, 1987 CoNo. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1668, 1668.
233. Revzin, Nuclear Project BedevilsAid for Pakistan, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1987, at 24, col.
1.
234. Murphy, supra note 6, at 53.
235. Gordon, Pakistan Rejects Atomic Inspection, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at AS, col. 1.
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materials if it desired additional United States assistance.236
Congress failed to pass a foreign aid appropriations bill before the
start of the fiscal year on October 1, 1987. Consequently, the President's
authority to waive the provisions of section 669 of the Foreign Assistance
Act expired on September 30, 1987. Foreign aid could no longer be le-
gally provided to Pakistan.237
The aid cutoff was to last only a few months. With the exception of
1985, Congress had not passed a separate authorization bill for foreign
aid since 1981. The legislative process again broke down in 1987. The
House approved the authorization bill of the Foreign Affairs Committee
on December 10, 1987, but the bill never became law because the Senate
refused to pass the authorization bill proposed by its Foreign Relations
Committee. Control over the President's foreign aid request shifted to
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 23
8
In August 1987 the House Appropriations Committee reported a
bill that provided the same levels of aid for Pakistan as requested, while
slashing the President's total foreign assistance budget by over sixteen
percent. The bill granted to the President the authority to waive section
699 from January 15, 1988 until September 30, 1988, while also requiring
the President to report to Congress on Pakistan's nuclear enrichment
activities.239
The aid package moved through Congress toward approval. On De-
cember 2, 1987, the House Rules Committee blocked Representative So-
larz from offering his amendment to the full House for a vote.240 The
next day, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of
236. H.R. Res. 239, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H6982-83 (daily cd. Aug. 3,
1987); S. Res. 266, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S11041 (daily ed. July 31, 1987).
237. See Pakistan Aid Battle Due, 1987 CONG. Q. WEEKLY Ri:P, 2392, 2392. Ambassador
Richard Kennedy admitted in testimony to Congress on October 22, 1987 that the Reagan
Administration did not have sufficiently reliable assurances to invoke the Symington Amend-
ment. Critically, he also stated that Pakistan had enriched uranium above the five percent
level at the Kahuta facility, meaning that Pakistan possessed weapons grade uranium. Paki-
stan and United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on
Arms Control, International Security, and Science, and Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 33-34 (1987) (testimony of Richard T. Kennedy, Ambassador at large and special advisor
to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs).
238. See generally Pressman, House Passes Foreign Aid Authorization Bill, 1987 CoNG, Q,
WEEKLY REP. 3056, 3056.
239. See H.R. REP. No. 283, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 96, 106-107 (1987). See also Towell,
House Panel Makes Deep Cuts In Foreign-Assistance Funding, 1987 CONG. Q, WEEKLY REP,
1900, 1900, 1902.




the fiscal 1988 foreign aid spending bill. The committee's bill contained
150 million dollars in economic and 200 million dollars in military aid
for Pakistan, a total reduction of 190 million dollars from the President's
budget request.
241
The Senate Appropriations Committee's bill also granted the Presi-
dent a six year exemption from section 699 conditioned on a complex set
of provisions directly linking aid for Pakistan with the nuclear programs
of both Pakistan and India. Neither American aid nor exports of sophis-
ticated equipment and technology with military applications to any
country in South Asia were to be allowed if the President determined
that the country was producing fissile material in unsafeguarded facili-
ties, until that country ceased producing such material. The President
could waive the cutoff of aid or export sales, however, if he certified to
Congress that a second nation was manufacturing fissile material in un-
safeguarded facilities, that the failure of the second nation to agree to
cease production of fissile material was a factor in the continued produc-
tion of fissile material in the first nation, and if the waiver was in the
national interest.242
The committee rejected past United States policy that concentrated
solely on Pakistan's nuclear efforts and called for a regional approach
because "the root cause of the nuclear problem in South Asia is competi-
tion between India and Pakistan." '243 Analysts interpreted the commit-
tee's linkage of the nuclear activities in Pakistan and India as a reflection
of the support to aid for Pakistan in Congress and an endorsement of
Pakistan's claim that it was justified in pursuing a nuclear weapons op-
tion because of India's 1974 nuclear test.2"
On December 12, 1987, the Financial Times of London reported
that Pakistan was building a second nuclear enrichment plant.245 Two
days later, both houses of Congress had passed their respective appropri-
ations bills and convened a conference committee. On December 17,
1987, the conference committee set aid for Pakistan was set at 480 mil-
241. S. 1924, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 36 (1987).
242. S. REP. No. 236, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 246-48 (1987). See Felton, supra note 240, at
2980. In linking the nuclear programs of Pakistan and India together for purposes of United
States aid to Pakistan, the Senate Appropriations Committee was following the lead of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee. The bill reported to Congress by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee rescinded the waiver of the Symington Amendment for Pakistan if India accepted
full-scope safeguards. Foreign Assistance Legislation For Fiscal Years 1988-1989 (Part 8):
Markup Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 907 (1987).
243. S. REP. No. 236, supra note 242, at 34.
244. Weisman, supra note 173, at E2.
245. Lewis, Report of Pakistani Plant for Nuclear-Arms Component Is Weighed, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
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lion dollars. The conference committee eliminated the conditions at-
tached to the funds in the Senate bill and, instead, the conferees provided
the President a two-and-a-half-year waiver of section 669.246
The conference committee's action came just a few hours before Ar-
shad Pervez was convicted by a federal jury in Philadelphia of attempting
to smuggle out of the United States nuclear weapons related material for
Pakistan.2 4 7 Also on December 17, 1987, President Reagan certified for
fiscal year 1988 that "Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive de-
vice and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce
significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive de-
vice." '248 Neither the Financial Times report nor the Pervez conviction
had any impact on the debate by the conference committee on the waiver
of section 669.249 With the prospect for a successful outcome to the Ge-
neva negotiations on a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan,
there was little chance of Congress encumbering United States assistance
to Pakistan, which might have been perceived by the Soviet Union as
weakening Pakistan's negotiating position.25
On December 22, 1987, Congress finally enacted the government's
budget for fiscal year 1988. Aid for Pakistan and waiver of section 669
was in the form agreed upon by the conference committee. Of the 480
million dollars in aid for Pakistan, 260 million dollars was in security
assistance and 220 million dollars in economic assistance. 251
10. President Reagan's Waivers of the Solarz and Symington
Amendments
During the second week of January 1988 the State Department sent
246. Calmes, Big Spending Decisions Go Down to the Wire, 1987 CONG, Q. WEEKLY REP.
3117, 3119; Felton, Military Programs Take Hits as Hill Cuts Back Foreign Aid, 1987 CoNG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 3122, 3122. The conference report was printed in the Congressional Rec-
ord. For the specific provisions on aid to Pakistan, see H.J. Res. 395, 100th Cong., 1st Sess,,
133 CONG. REC. at H12431, H12434, H12436, H12443 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987, pt. III).
247. Oberdorfer, Conferees Won't Penalize Pakistan, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1987, at A10,
col. 1.; Spector Interview, supra note 155.
248. Presidential Determination 88-4, 3 C.F.R. 316 (1988). In his communication to Con-
gress accompanying the certification, President Reagan emphasized that he had "taken into
account the fact that the statutory standard as legislated by Congress is whether Pakistan
possesses a nuclear explosive device, not whether Pakistan is attempting to develop or has
developed the various relevant capacities." Letter from President Reagan to Jim Wright,
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Dec. 17, 1981).
249. Spector Interview, supra note 155.
250. STAFF REPoRT, supra note 29, at 13. See Pressman, supra note 238, at 3058.
251. Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-142, 1329-148, 1329-




a memorandum to President Reagan concluding that the Pakistani Gov-
ernment was involved in the smuggling activities of Arshad Pervez. The
memorandum recommended to President Reagan that he waive the So-
larz Amendment, otherwise United States aid would have to be termi-
nated.252 The State Department's conclusion that Pervez was acting on
behalf of Pakistan was one of five tests that had to have been satisfied
before President Reagan could find a violation of the Solarz Amendment.
The other tests were that Pakistan did not currently possess nuclear
weapons; that the illegal export or attempt to export actually took place,
which occurred on or after August 8, 1985; that the material would con-
tribute significantly an ability to manufacture a nuclear device; and that
Pakistan was to have used the material for that purpose.253
On January 15, 1988, President Reagan determined that "material,
equipment, or technology covered by that provision [the Solarz Amend-
ment] was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explo-
sive device." '254 President Reagan then immediately waived the
termination of United States assistance required by his determination.
He certified under section 670(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act that
"not providing assistance... [to Pakistan] would be seriously prejudicial
to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives and
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security." 2 "- Following
the waiver of the Solarz Amendment, President Reagan proceeded to
waive section 669, relating to nuclear enrichment transfers, of the Act
until April 1, 1990.2 6
The Reagan Administration justified the waiver on the basis that
continuation of United States aid to Pakistan was "vital to demonstrate
U.S. resolve to resist Soviet aggression" and termination of United States
aid "would undermine efforts to bring about a Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, place in doubt the credibility of established U.S. security
commitments, and jeopardize important U.S. security interests through-
out the region."2" 7 The Administration also stated Pakistan had pledged
252. Shipler, State Dept Links Pakistan to Atom Shipping Plot, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1988,
at A3, col. 1.
253. 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). See Shipler, supra note 252, at A3.
254. Presidential Determination 88-5, 53 Fed. Reg. 3325 (1988). See Wimes, Reagan
Agrees to Continued Aid to Pakistan, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16, 1988, Pt. I, at 8, col. 1.
255. Presidential Determination 88-5, 53 Fed. Reg. 3325 (1988).
256. Id.
257. The White House, Justification For Presidential Determination To Authorize Security
Assistance For Pakistan 1 (Jan. 15, 1988) (press release) [hereinafter Justification]. See White
House Statement on the Continuation of Aid to Pakistan, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 44
(Jan. 15, 1988).
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that it would "halt the illegal procurement of US goods for its nuclear
program. ' 258 An additional, though not officially stated, reason for the
two Presidential waivers was the fear that Pakistan would respond to an
aid cutoff by severing the United States aid pipeline to the Afghan
rebels.259
Senator Glenn criticized the Administration's action as "only invit-
ing further attempts to [violate United States nuclear nonproliferation]
laws, not only by Pakistan, but by other nations with whom we share
regional military interests. '' 260 Yet, even Senator Glenn, one the most
knowledgeable members of Congress on nuclear affairs and strongest
critics of the Reagan Administration's nonproliferation policies, did not
want the United States to end its support for Pakistan. At most, he ad-
vocated forcing Pakistan to choose between United States military aid
and continued production of fissile material.261
Ultimately, there was little chance that critics of unconditional aid
to Pakistan would gain the upperhand during 1988. Pakistan was freed
from the restrictions of the Symington Amendment until April 1, 1990.
Moreover, as the months passed by in 1988, United States nonprolifera-
tion policy was dictated less by the debates on Capitol Hill than events
occurring outside the United States.
11. The Geneva Peace Accord and Election of Benazir Bhutto
On April, 14, 1988, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the
United States signed accords for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan and for the non-interference and non-intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan.262 As recognized at the time,
the accords in no way guaranteed a peaceful future for Afghanistan. The
Afghan rebels were not a party to the accords and neither they nor the
Soviet forces were required to stop fighting. In addition, none of the
agreements mentioned how Afghanistan would be governed in the
future.263
258. Justification, supra note 257, at 1.
259. See Shipler, supra note 252, at A3 ("The Administration, depending on Pakistan as a
route for supplies to the Afghan guerrillas, has tried to avoid any actions that would anger the
Government in Islamabad.").
260. Office of Senator John Glenn, Glenn Criticizes Proposed Loophole for Pakistan (Jan,
15, 1988) (press release).
261. Letter from Senator John Glenn to author (Apr. 14, 1988).
262. See Lewis, Four Nations Sign Accords For Soviet Afghan Pullout; Fierce Fighting Still
Likely, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
263. Felton, Provisions of the Afghanistan Accord ...... From Pullout Date to Refugees'
Fate, 1988 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 994, 995.
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Despite predictions that the eventual end of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan would lead to greater scrutiny by the United States of Paki-
stan's nuclear program, 264 the Afghanistan settlement locked United
States nonproliferation policy on Pakistan in place. The scheduled Feb-
ruary 15, 1989 pullout of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and continued
Pakistani assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen was foremost on the
minds of most members of Congress.265  Furthermore, following the
death of President Zia and United States Ambassador Arnold Raphel in
an airplane crash in August, and with Pakistani parliamentary elections
scheduled for November, Congress sought to reassure Pakistan of contin-
ued United States support.2 66 Consequently, Congress appropriated mil-
itary and economic assistance for Pakistan near the levels requested by
President Reagan in his fiscal year 1989 budget.267
The November elections presented Pakistan with its first opportu-
nity to achieve democracy in more than a decade.268 Benazir Bhutto, the
daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, and her People's
Party, emerged as the clear winners in the elections and she became
Prime Minister on December 1, 1988.269 Her election and the restora-
tion of democracy to Pakistan raised hopes that Pakistani-Indian rela-
tions would improve.27 In particular, Benazir Bhutto had criticized the
Zia government for pursuing a covert nuclear program271 and stated that
"[w]e certainly don't want nuclear proliferation.1
272
264. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 13; Tefft, Pakistan-US ties face Afghan test,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 19, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
265. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 13.
266. Felton, Rare Aid Funding Bill Comes Down to the Wire, 1988 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 2731, 2738.
267. President Reagan requested $240 million in military aid and S250 million in economic
aid for Pakistan. Felton, Salvador-Aid Issue Re-Emerges in Senate Panel, 1988 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1740, 1742. The foreign assistance spending bill passed by Congress provided
$215 million in economic aid and $230 million in military aid. Importantly, all of the military
assistance was in the form of grants. Act of Oct. 1, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 102 Stat. 2268,
2268-11, 2268-17. In fiscal year 1987, only S30 million in military aid was in the form a grant,
the remainder in the form of a loan. Felton, Absence of Partisan Bickering Marks Foreign-Aid
Funding Bill, 1988 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1236, 1237.
268. Weintraub, Democracy May Be in Pakistan's Grasp, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 9,
1988, at A14, col. 1.
269. Crossette, Daughter of Determination, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
270. The Prime Minister herself stated that "[w]e believe that with the induction of a dem-
ocratic government, relations [with India] will improve. After all, don't both nations have
common problems of poverty and illiteracy? Confrontation does not help." Gupta, Too Good
to be True, INDIA TODAY, Sept. 15, 1988, at 20, 21 (interview with Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto). -
271. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 16.
272. Gupta, supra note 270, at 21.
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In India, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is known as "the principal
opponent within his government to a nuclear weapons program. "273 In
June 1988 Prime Minister Gandhi proposed at the United Nations a
three tier approach to global nuclear arms control. The plan envisioned
the superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Second-rank nuclear
nations, Great Britain, France, and China, would freeze their forces at
current levels. Third tier nations, the near-nuclear states such as Argen-
tina, Brazil, Pakistan, and India, would agree to remain nonnuclear.
2 7 4
Of immediate significance, the Gandhi proposal signals that India
may now be willing to discuss nuclear affairs bilaterally with Pakistan.
Previously, India refused to discuss regional solutions until the super-
powers first agreed to arms reductions.275 Pakistan has repeatedly pro-
posed that India and Pakistan jointly sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty or declare South Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone.276
At the December 29-31, 1988 meetings of the South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Prime Ministers Bhutto and
Gandhi established an "instant rapport" and signed a treaty not to attack
the nuclear facilities of each other's nation.277 While outstanding
problems remain between both nations, especially on nuclear affairs, the
SAARC meetings created the possibility of a "fresh start" for India and
Pakistan to end their forty years of hostility.
27 8
Hardly noticed at all in the aftermath of the November elections in
Pakistan and the United States, President Reagan on November 18, 1988
issued the executive certification that "Pakistan does not possess a nu-
clear explosive device" required for United States assistance to be fur-
273. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 17.
274. See, eg., id. at 21-22; L. Spector, Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security 15 (Oct.
6, 1988) (remarks before the Southwest Asia Working Group of the National Defense Univer-
sity). At the same United Nations session, Secretary of State George Shultz publicly urged
India and Pakistan to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He stated that " '[tloday It Is
in South Asia that the (nuclear) danger is most acute. We encourage the states of South Asia
to take concrete steps to meet this urgent challenge.'" Shultz Asks India, Pakistan to Sign
Treaty, San Francisco Chron., June 14, 1988, at A15, col. 4.
275. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 20, 22; L. Spector, supra note 274, at 15-16.
276. Pakistan Offers Nuclear Choices, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1987, at A26, col. 3 (Letter to
the editor from Jamsheed K.A. Marker, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States).
"Prime Minister Junejo said Pakistan would sign the NPT immediately, 'within a day,' if India
would do likewise, which is unlikely." King, supra note 221, at 11.
277. Ali, A Hint of Hope, supra note 3, at 10.
278. Id. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan, other than signing the agreement not to attack
each other's nuclear installations, did not discuss nuclear issues in a regional context. Instead,
the issue was debated as a global concern, "a rather futile exercise" in the words of one re-
porter. McEwen, Commonwealth Re-entry is Likely Uuder Bhutto, The Times (London), Jan.
2, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
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nished to Pakistan for fiscal year 1989.279 It was reported that
"intelligence information on Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme had
become so voluminous that concerned US officials could no longer agree
on whether the administration could truthfully provide the
certification."280
In essence, the decision was a political one. In light of the serious
consequences for American-Pakistani relations if President Reagan did
not issue the certification, and with the war in Afghanistan still raging,
the Reagan Administration decided to leave the resolution of the issue to
the new governments in Washington and Islamabad.2 '
IV. CONCLUSION
The Reagan Administration strongly supported aid for Pakistan as
essential to counter the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Congress, in
turn, accepted the Administration's arguments and felt Pakistan should
be rewarded for acting as the conduit for United States covert aid to the
Afghan rebels and providing sanctuary for three million Afghan refu-
gees.282 Consequently, the United States declined to impose an aid cutoff
as required under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Instead, the
United States crafted a series of loopholes in its nonproliferation laws for
Pakistan while the former government of President Zia achieved the ca-
pability to manufacture a nuclear device.
President Reagan waived, by certification to Congress, three of the
four cutoff provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act that apply to all
nations which receive United States assistance.283 On January 15, 1988,
he waived until April 1, 1990, section 669, which denies aid to any nation
receiving unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment technology. 2 $ President
Reagan indefinitely waived section 670(a)(1)(A), relating to transfers of
nuclear reprocessing technology, on February 10, 1982, pursuant to the
279. Presidential Determination No. 89-7, 53 Fed. Reg. 49111 (1988).
280. Chanda, See No Evil, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 5, 1989, at 11, 11.
281. Id.
282. See Madison, supra note 148, at 1774.
283. The largest recipient of American assistance, Israel, is covered by the Glenn-Syming-
ton Amendments. However, the amendments mandate a cutoff of aid to nations receiving
enrichment and reprocessing technology only on or after August 4, 1977. 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2429(a)-2429a(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Israel either has built indigenous nuclear facili-
ties or received enrichment and reprocessing technology from foreign suppliers before August
4, 1977. See L. SPEcTOR, supra note 3, at 146-47. See generally TASK FORCc, supra note 6, at
5.
284. Presidential Determination 88-5, 53 Fed. Reg. 3325 (1988). Congress provided Presi-
dent Reagan the authority to waive section 669 as part of 1987 aid package for Pakistan. 22
U.S.C.A. § 2375(d) (West Supp. 1988).
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"built in" certification provision of section 670(a)(2) of the Act.285 Also,
pursuant to section 670(a)(2), the President waived Section 670(a)(1)(B),
the Solarz Amendment, on January 15, 1988.286 The waiver of the So-
larz Amendment applied only retroactively to Arshad Pervez's activities
on behalf of Pakistan. A waiver of the remaining cutoff provision, sec-
tion 670(b), has not been considered since it penalizes nations involved in
the transfer or detonation of nuclear weapons by NNWS.287 Pakistan
has neither received nor tested a nuclear weapon.
The certification requirement on possession of a nuclear device is a
provision within the Foreign Assistance Act specific to Pakistan.288
President Reagan conveyed the certification to Congress for fiscal years
1986 through 1989.289
There is little doubt today that Pakistan could assemble a nuclear
weapon in a short period of time.290 Richard Kennedy, the Reagan Ad-
ministration's Special Ambassador on Nonproliferation Affairs, admitted
in testimony to Congress in October 1987 that Pakistan had enriched
uranium above the five percent level.291 President Reagan determined in
January 1988 that the material Arshad Pervez attempted to smuggle out
of the United States "was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a
nuclear explosive device. '292 Also, President Reagan, in a letter to Con-
gress accompanying his final certification that Pakistan did not possess a
nuclear device, said that "'as Pakistan's nuclear capabilities grow and if
evidence of its activities continues to accumulate,'" t future certification
may be "'difficult or impossible to make with any degree of
certainty.' ,293
A basic point that must not be forgotten is tha.t the United States
furnished Pakistan several billion dollars in economic and military assist-
ance during the period that Pakistan achieved the capability to produce
nuclear weapons. Moreover, the United States allowed the former gov-
285. Presidential Determination No. 82-7, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1983), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 2375 app. at 206 (West Supp. 1988).
286. Presidential Determination 88-5, 53 Fed. Reg. 3325 (1988).
287. See 22 U.S.C. § 2429a(b) (1982).
288. 22 U.S.C. § 2375(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
289. Presidential Determination No. 86-03, 3 C.F.R. 427 (1986), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.
§ 2375(e) app. at 761 (Supp. IV 1986); Presidential Determination No. 87-3, 3 C.F.R. 275
(1987); reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2375(e) app. at 761 (Supp. IV 1986): Presidential Deternina.
tion 88-4, 3 C.F.R. 316 (1988); Presidential Determination 89-7, 53 Fed. Reg. 49111 (1988).
290. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 237.
292. Presidential Determination 88-5, 53 Fed. Reg. 3325 (1988).
293. Chanda, supra note 280, at 11. See Gordon, German Concern Said to Aid Pakistan A-
Weapons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, at A6, col. 4.
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ernment of President Zia to achieve this capability despite President Zia
breaking repeated pledges that Pakistan would not develop nuclear
weapons, enrich weapons grade uranium, or illegally procure nuclear
weapons related technology from the United States.
The events in Afghanistan have critically influenced United States-
Pakistani relations for the last decade. The Reagan Administration ulti-
mately decided to do nothing which would threaten the Afghan insur-
gents at any level. Consequently, the United States leverage over
Pakistan was quite limited.2 94 Now that Soviet Union has withdrawn its
forces from Afghanistan, it is time for the United States to reconsider
whether it should continue to subordinate its nonproliferation policy in
favor of its strategic interests in South Asia.
Furthermore, United States nonproliferation laws will necessitate a
re-examination of United States policy on Pakistan. Congress will have
to decide whether to extend the waiver of the Symington Amendment
beyond April 1, 1990. Of more pressing concern, the Bush Administra-
tion will have to make the difficult decision as to whether it can honestly
certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device for fiscal year
1990, which begins on October 1, 1989. To certify that Pakistan does not
possess a nuclear device when their scientists are only the "turn of a
screw" away from completion makes a mockery of United States
proliferation laws and undermines the credibility of the United States.
The United States must continue to pressure Pakistan on the nuclear
issue.
One policy option for the United States would be to punish Pakistan
for its nuclear activities by terminating United States aid and military
sales. Neither Congress nor the Bush Administration would support
such a proposal, especially in light of Prime Minister Bhutto's favorable
statements concerning nonproliferation.295 Pakistan did receive less
funds for fiscal year 1989 than fiscal year 1988, but that was basically
attributable to the United States budget deficit and the need to find sav-
ings in all areas of the budget.296
A review of the history of the nonproliferation regime shows that
United States leverage can not stop a nation, with a sufficient technologi-
294. Ebinger Interview, supra note 131.
295. President Reagan's fiscal year 1990 budget requested S230 million in military grants
and $215 million in economic aid for Pakistan. HL1L Doc. No. 101-4, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
app. I-D2-D3 (1989).
296. Pakistan received $445 million in military and economic aid in fiscal year 1989, as
compared to $480 million for fiscal year 1988. One could argue though that Pakistan got a
better "deal" with the fiscal year 1989 allotment since all of the military aid was in the form of
a grant, rather than a loan. See supra notes 251 and 267 and accompanying text.
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cal base, determined to pursue the weapons option from obtaining a nu-
clear device, absent the nation's dependence upon security guarantees
from the United States. The previous aid cutoffs by -the United States did
not halt Pakistan's program.297 While Pakistan is more dependant on
United States foreign assistance today, Pakistan's program has greatly
advanced over the last decade and it is doubtful a future aid cutoff would
convince Pakistan to disavow the nuclear weapons option.
Although the United States aid program did not alter Pakistan's nu-
clear intentions, as the Reagan Administration argued it would, United
States aid has been one factor contributing to Pakistan's decision not to
test a nuclear weapon. The threat of terminating assistance has also ef-
fectively prevented Pakistan from reprocessing spent fuel into plutonium.
In addition, the United States led an international embargo of commer-
cial nuclear technology against Pakistan, depriving Pakistan of nuclear
power reactors it seeks for long-term economic development.298
A possible compromise measure would be for Congress to amend
the Presidential certification by no longer requiring the President to cer-
tify that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons. Instead, Congress
could revive the 1987 proposed amendment by Representative Solarz. It
would have required that the President certify that Pakistan was not en-
riching uranium above the five percent level, otherwise aid would be cut
off.
2 9 9
This approach has the principal advantage of avoiding the dilemma
between following the law and terminating United States foreign aid or
playing a game of semantics with the word "possession" and continuing
assistance. Therefore, it would provide the United States more flexibility
in pursuing its nonproliferation policy, without risking a potentially hos-
tile and counterproductive confrontation with Pakistan nor abandoning
all leverage over Pakistan's nuclear decisions.
Moreover, an enrichment certification is the most realistic alterna-
tive. The United States can not undo what Pakistan has achieved. But if
Pakistan were to limit its future enrichment of uranium to the five per-
cent level, Pakistan's nuclear program would come to a standstill. Prime
297. See Van Hollen, supra note 47, at 161 ("The U.S. experiences with Pakistan regarding
the Glenn and Symington Amendments, and with India and the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act, offer a clear message: a highly visible U.S. threat to stop economic assistance, or to cut off
nuclear fuel, will not succeed on issues deemed vital to a country's sovereignty and security,").
298. See generally STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 26.
299. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. The proposed Solarz amendment itself
was modeled after the nonbinding resolutions passed by Congress in July and August 1987




Minister Bhutto, in a visit to the United States before the November 1988
elections, indicated her willingness to provide assurances that Pakistan
would not develop nuclear weapons. In particular, she noted that "if
U.S. intelligence has been able to detect Pakistan's efforts to enrich ura-
nium and acquire bomb components, it presumably would be able to ver-
ify a Pakistani pledge not to engage in such activity." 30
It is important to remember that Pakistan's nuclear program devel-
oped out of its rivalry with India and, in response, to India's nuclear
activities. India's security concerns are not limited to Pakistan. India
sought its nuclear option as a counter to the Chinese bomb. Given In-
dia's superiority in conventional arms, there would be little need for In-
dia to develop nuclear weapons to defend itself against a nonnuclear
Pakistan.30'
The nuclear future of South Asia lies most directly in the hands of
Pakistan and India. The current political climate between India and
Pakistan presents the best opportunity in decades to resolve the hostility
between the two nations. While India has rejected proposals calling for
safeguards on additional nuclear facilities in each nation,30 2 bilateral
agreements could serve as confidence building measures and reduce "the
momentum toward further proliferation."
3 3
However, a resolution to the South Asian nuclear challenge can not
ignore the threat that China's nuclear forces poses to India.304 Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi's December 1988 visit to China was a cautious
step toward improving relations between the two nations 305 and may one
day contribute toward a regional nonproliferation agreement, which
would include China.
The most constructive policy for the United States would be to con-
tinue United States assistance to Pakistan while placing a more visible
emphasis on nonproliferation policy in its foreign policy. The United
States is perceived "as an important actor in the region' ' 31, and should
orchestrate a multilateral diplomatic campaign to convince India and
Pakistan to agree to freeze their nuclear programs. The Carnegie Task
Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security recommended in
January 1988 that the nuclearization of South Asia "deserves [an] inter-
300. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 17.
301. Id. at 15.
302. See id. at 22-24; Letter from Dr. Randy Rydell, professional staff member of the
United States Senate Committee on Government Affairs, to author (Feb. 15, 1989).
303. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 83 (emphasis omitted).
304. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 15.
305. Delfs & Manchanda, Return to Realism, FAR E. ECON. Rv., Jan. 5, 1989, at 10.
306. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 26.
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national dispute-settlement effortfl on a par with those that have been
mounted in recent years to end the Iran-Iraq War, resolve Arab-Israeli
differences, and obtain the withdrawal of Soviet firces from Afghani-
stan."' 7 Such an effort, combined with an agreement between Pakistan
and India to reciprocal inspections of key nuclear facilities, would repre-
sent major progress in averting a South Asian nuclear arms race.
In addition, the United States must be mindful of the global ramifi-
cations of a peaceful settlement of the Indo-Pakistani dispute. William
Walker and Mans L6nnnroth have called the period between 1983 and
1995 "a testing time for the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]. 30 8 One
more review conference is scheduled to be held in 1990. Then in 1995,
the NPT comes up for renewal. Article X specifies that "[tiwenty-five
years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be con-
vened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or
shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision
shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. ' 3 9 A lessening
of the nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India would reinvigorate the
nuclear nonproliferation regime and offer hope thai. the global commu-
nity will renew the NPT.
307. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 108 (emphasis omitted).
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